UIC Law Review
Volume 24

Issue 4

Article 2

Summer 1991

Voluntary Affirmative Action in Employment for Women and
Minorities under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Extending
Possibilities for Employers to Engage in Preferential Treatment to
Achieve Equal Employment Opportunity, 24 J. Marshall L. Rev. 731
(1991)
Chris Engels

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons,
Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and
Gender Commons, and the Law and Race Commons

Recommended Citation
Chris Engels, Voluntary Affirmative Action in Employment for Women and Minorities under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act: Extending Possibilities for Employers to Engage in Preferential Treatment to Achieve
Equal Employment Opportunity, 24 J. Marshall L. Rev. 731 (1991)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss4/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN AND
MINORITIES UNDER TITLE VII OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT:
EXTENDING POSSIBILITIES FOR
EMPLOYERS TO ENGAGE IN
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO
ACHIEVE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
BY CHRIS ENGELS*

Table of Contents

7..........................732

INTRODUCTION
PERMISSIBLE AFFIRmATIVE ACTION ..................
A. The Principle of Voluntary Affirmative Action

I.

B. Reaction to Weber and Johnson
C. Limitations on Affirmative Action
II.

735
.

.........
.....

THREE PRONG ANALYSIS FOR ASSESSING THE VALIDITY
..
..
...
OF AFFIRmAmLE ACTION PLANS..

A. Justification: The Manifest Imbalance
.....................
Requirement..
1. Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans to Redress
.
...
Societal Discrimination
2. Identifying the Manifest Imbalance---"The
Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away": From Johnston to Johnson ..
3. The Magnitude of the Manifest Imbalance
...
4. The Employer's Burden of Proof ..
.............
B. Burden Prong ...........
*

735

741
745
746
749
749

753
759
761

767

Assistant Professor of Labor Law, Catholic University of Leuven,

Belgium (1984-90).

LL.M., University of California, Los Angeles, School of

Law, 1990; Ph.D., Catholic Umversity of Leuven, Belgium, School of Law, 1989;
Licentiate of Law, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, School of Law, 1984.
The author is extremely grateful to Professor Christine A. Littleton, Umversity of Califorma, Los Angeles, School of Law, without whom this article
would certainly not be what it is today, and to Professor William B. Gould,
Stanford Umversity, School of Law, for the many constructive comments.

The John Marshall Law Revew

[Vol. 24:731

1. Constitutional and Title VII Burden Analysis
Compared ................................
2. Absolute Bar ..............................
3. Rights of White Males at Different Stages of
the Employment Relationship ..................
a. Hiring ................................
b. Promotion ..............................
c. Preferential Layoff Provisions ............
1) Discharge and Replacement v. Layoffs ...
2) Seniority Rights ........................
3) Duty of Fair Representation ............
C. Remedial Nature Prong ...........................
1. Attainment of a Balanced Work Force .........
2. Liberal Construction of the Temporariness
Requirement ...............................
CONCLUSION ..............................................

768
771
782
783
784
787
787
792
801
806
806
809
813

INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")' prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race and sex.2 Frequently, authorities read this prohibition as making race and sex
impermissible criteria that employers can never take into account
when making employment decisions.3 Such readings suggest that
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
2. This analysis deals only with the validity of affirmative action plans
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"). LImited comparisons with
the analysis of the constitutional validity of affirmative action plans under the
equal protection clause will be drawn. These references to the equal protection
analysis are meant to be merely descriptive, and do not take any position towards its correctness or desirability. Affirmative action by public employers
involves state action and is thus subject to the requirements imposed by the
equal protection clause. Title VII, however, does not only apply to private employers, but also encompasses public employers. Much of the available case law
deals with public employers instituting affirmative action efforts. In as far as
the cases dealing with public employers separate the constitutional from the
statutory analysis, it is permissible to refer to them m an analysis dealing only
with the statutory validity of affirmative action plans under Title VII.
3. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal.,
480 U.S. 616, 657-77 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United Steelworkers, AFLCIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216-55 (1979) (Burger, C.J. and Rebnquist, J.,
dissenting); Abraham, Some Post-Bakke-and-Weber Reflections on "Reverse
Discrimznation",14 U. RICH. L. REV. 373 (1979-80); Gold, Grggs'Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Orgin of the Adverse Impact Definition of
Employment Discrzmznation and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDus.
REL. L.J. 429, 508-09 (1985); Meltzer, The Weber Case: The JudictalAbrogation
of the AntidiscrminationStandard%n Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423,465
(1980); Reynolds, Indiwdualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93
YALE L. J. 995 (1984); Schiff, Reverse DiscriminationRe-Defined as Equal Protectiom The OrwellianNightmare in the Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws, 8
HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 627, 627-28, 684-86 (1985); Van Alstyne, Rites of Pas-
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the resulting anti-discrimnation principle governs all of the followIng stages of the employment relationship: hiring, employing, promoting, and firing. However, the purpose of Title VII was not
merely to encourage the appearance of neutrality, but to also create
equal employment opportunities for all.4 A mere prohibition of discrinnmatory practices remains incapable of achieving the goals of
either redressing a distorted situtation or leading to a substantial
improvement of female and minority participation at all levels of
employment.5
Affirmative action would be one way to lessen the disparity between aspiration and achievement.6 To what extent does Title VII
allow an employer to follow this road? At what speed may the employer drive his "affirmative action vehicle" on this road? And
what are the prerequisites for obtaining an affirmative action
"driver's license" in the first place?
The question is whether, under what conditions, and to what
extent a private employer under Title VII may voluntarily grant
preferential treatment in the allocation of job opportunities to qualified female and minority applicants or employees who are not necessarily victims of prior employment discrimiation, in order to
overcome the effects of a long history of discrimination, regardless
of whether the discrimination stems from a particular employer's
own making or was of societal origin. 7
This article attempts to define the boundries of voluntary affirmative action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The article
sage: Race, the Supreme Cour4 and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775,
777-78 n.9, 783-86 (1979); Vaughn, Employment Quotas - Discrmmnation or
Affirmative Action, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 552, 553-58 (1982); Walker, The ExorbitantCost of RedistributingInjustice: A CriticalView of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber and the Misgutded Policy of Numerzcal Employment,
21 B.C.L. REv. 1 (1979).
4. Congress recognized that the integration of minorities into the mainstream of American society could not be acneved unless minorities were able to
secure jobs "which have a future." See-United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979). This was considered a necessary condition
for the achievement of equality of treatment more in general. Id. at 203.
5. For a discussion regarding the slow progress made in achievmg the goal
of real equality of employment opportunities for women and ethnic minorities,
see Edwards, The Annual John Randolph Tucker Lecture: The Future of Affirmative Action in Employment, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 763, 767-68 (1987);
Edwards & Zaretski, PreferentialRemedies for Employment Discrmmnation,
74 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 3-9 (1975); Comment, Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC.: Regroupzng zn SingularTimes, 104 HARV.L. REV. 525, 534 (1990).
6. W GouLD, BLAcK WORKERS INWirE UNIONS 100-01, 107 '(1977).
7. Granting relief to an individualized victim of employer discrimination is
not a form of affirmative action. When an employer discriminates on the basis
of race or sex, in violation of Title VII, it is required to redress the effects of its
own prior wrongdoing, at least when the victim challenges the discriminatory
employer practice in due time, and according to the procedures set forth in Title
VII.
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adopts a broad definition of the concept of voluntary affirmative
action plans. This concept includes all plans instituted wzthout any
legal requirement imposed upon the private employer to engage in
any kind of preferential treatment.8
This article proposes that Title VII, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, allows a private employer to institute affirmative
action plans not only to redress the effects of its own prior discriminatory employment practices, but also to remedy the result of prior
societal discrimination. The article advocates that the Supreme
Court underwrote this idea upon determining the basic condition an
employer must fulfill prior to engaging m affirmative action. However, the Court used an overly restrictive, and logically mconsistent
test to determine if this basic requirement is satisfied. Based on the
analytical framework the Court adopted for "reverse discrimination" law suits by white male employees challenging the validity of
affirmative action plans for women and minorities, the employer
should be granted much more leeway in determining whether it is
justified in instituting an affirmative action plan.
The Supreme Court's acceptance of voluntary affirmative action in compliance with the dictates of Title VII is not unconditional. In order to survive the Court's scrutiny, an affirmative
action plan must satisfy several conditions. The Court imposes
these conditons as a safeguard for white male employees' rights.
Employers must avoid the unnecessary trammeling of the rights
and the legitimate, firmly rooted expectations of non-beneficiaries
of the affirmative action plan. Yet the Court failed to clearly articulate the particular necessary conditions. Instead, the Court preferred a strategy of labeling particular plans as either satisfying or
failing to satisfy these unspecified conditions.
This article argues that differences in the techniques used to
create an affirmative action plan (sex or race as a factor to be taken
into account, quotas or percentages goals or set asides) do not warrant different treatment in establishing their statutory validity.
This article advances a similar argument when dealing with the different "goods" (hiring, promoting, layoffs) implicated by an affirmative action plan. For example, although the Supreme Court
clearly held that an affirmative action plan must necessarily be a
8. Voluntary affirmative action plans thus include plans unilaterally instituted by the employer, plans contained in collective barganing agreements
with the union as exclusive bargaining representative for the unit involved, and
plans contained in consent decrees. The concept does not include court-ordered
affirmative action plans, nor courts' modifications of consent decrees over the
objections of the parties involved in the original decree. See United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561 (1984).
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temporary measure to overcome the inequities of past discrnination, this requirement must necessarily be interpreted liberally, so
that the absence of an explicit end term in the affirmative action
plan should never lead to the plan's invalidation. The fact that an
affirmative action plan can not create an absolute bar to the advancement of white male employees should not prevent an employer from accelerating the effort to undo the effects of prior
discrimination, as long as reasonable room is left for white male
participation.
The Supreme Court describes its statutory analysis of the conditions for validity of an affirmative action plan as two-pronged.
The first prong is referred to as the justification prong of the analysis, while the second prong is referred to as the burden prong. However, a three prong classification of the conditions of validity of an
affirmative action plan under Title VII is a more accurate description of the Court's approach. The second prong of the Court's analysis contains elements that, though closely related to the rights of
the plan's non-beneficiaries, do not refer to the burden that is being
imposed or to the possible infrmgment of the white male's rights.
Instead, these elements refer to the nature and the goals of the plan
itself. Thus, without adding any additional requirements that an
ffirmative action plan must satisfy to pass muster under Title VII,
it seems accurate to describe the Court's analysis as a three part
inquiry: (1) justification for the plan's institution, (21 the burden
imposed upon the white male majority, and (3) the goal and remedial nature of the plan.
I.

A

PERMISSIBLE AFFIMATivE ACTION

The Prncipleof Voluntary Affirmative Action

On at least two occasions, the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of the permissibility of purely private and unilateral affirmative action efforts by employers under Title VII.9 In
United Steel-Workers of Amenca, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber,O the
Court explicitly refused to "define in detail, the line of demarcation
9. In Local Number 93, Int' Ass'n of Firefightersv. Cleveland, the Court
dealt with the question of whether Title VII mposed greater restrictions on
voluntary affirmative action plans contained in consent decrees, as compared to
purely private affirmative action efforts. The Supreme Court held that it did
not. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland,. 478 U.S. 501
(1986). Although the Court confirmed Weber and its underlying reasoning, the
decision did not reach the question of the conditions of validity of voluntary
affirmative action plans. Therefore, an analysis of Local Number 93 will not
shed any further light on the issue of the permissibility of voluntary affirmative
action.
10. United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans."' 1
In Johnson v. TransportationAgency, Santa Clara County, Californma,'2 the Supreme Court assessed the legality of the affirmative
action effort, using the Weber decision as a guide.1 3 A detailed analysis of both decisions is necessary to understand the underlying reasoning and to tease out "lines of demarcation" latent in the
opinions.
Weber dealt with an affirmative action plan included m a collective bargaining argeement. 14 Kaiser Alumimum & Chemical
Corporation and the United Steelworkers of America entered into a
bargaining agreement that contained an affirmative action plan
aimed at eliminating the imbalance that existed in the plant's then
almost exclusively white craft workforce. Because blacks have historically been excluded from craft unions, few skilled black workers were available. To meet the set goals, the company decided to
begin a training program to teach the skills necessary to become a
craftworker. 15 The program was accessible to both black and white
production workers. Fifty percent of the new trainees were to be
black until the percentage of skilled black craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. The company selected the remaining trainees on the
11. Id. at 208.
12. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616 (1987).
13. Id. at 627.
14. For general discussion of Weber, see Allegretti, Voluntary Racial Goals
After Weber: How High Is Too High?, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 773 (1984); Belton,

DiscriminationandAffirmative Atio" An Analysts of Competing Theores of

Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REV. 531, 568-75 (1981); Blumrosen, Affirmative
Action in Employment After Weber, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1981); Boyd, Affirmative Action in Employment - The Weber Decision, 66 IowA L. REv. 1
(1980); Buckley, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans under Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 711, 714-16 (1988); Cox, The
Question of "Voluntary" Racial Employment Quotas and Some Thoughts on
JudicialRole, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 87, 98-104 (1981); Gould, The Supreme Court and
LaborLaw: The October 1978 Term, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 649-58 (1979); Kilberg
& Tallent, From Bakke to Fullilove: The Use of Racial and Ethnic Preferences
in Employment, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 366-68 (1981); Kreiling & Mercurio, Beyond Weber: The Broadentng Scope of JudicialApproval of Affirmative Action, 88 DICK. L. REV. 46, 54-58 (1983); Meltzer, supra note 3, at 437-56;
Rutherglen & Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitutionand Title VIL
From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 467, 472-74 (1988); Schiff,
supra note 3, at 656-60; Vaughn, supra note 3, at 555-58; Walker, supra note 3;
Note, Bakke and Weber: The Concept of Societal Discrimination,11 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 297, 307-11 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Societal Discrimznation];Note,
Labor Law - Employment Discrim-ination- Voluntary Affirmative Action
Plan with Racial Quota Does Not Violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 54 TUL. L. REV. 244 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Racial Quota].
15. Prior to 1974, black workers represented only 1.83% of the skilled
craftworkers at Kaiser's Gramercy plant. The work force in the area was approximately 39% black. United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 198-99 (1979).
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basis of seniority. The company excluded Brian, Weber, a white
production worker who wanted to participate in the training program, even though he possessed more semority than several of the
black workers selected. Weber challenged the plan as being discrmnniatory on the basis of-race and thus m violation of Title VII.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit considered the plan to be discriminatory in violation of Title
VII. The District Court held that all affirmative action was beyond
the reach of private employers based upon its reading of sections
703(a) and (d) of Title VII. Only courts possessed the power to fashion this kind of relief.16 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
on different grounds. The court would have allowed an employer to
institute an affirmative action plan to "restore employees to their
rightful place" only upon a showing of its own prior employment
discrimiataon.' 7 The Supreme Court reversed. I s r
Weber argued that a literal interpretation of Sections 703(a)
and (b) of Title VII I9 of the Civil Rights Act prohibits race-conscious affirmative action plans because these sections state:
(a) it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national orgm; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any mdividual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and that
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeslp or other training or retraining, including on-the-job trainmg programs to discrnmate against any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment
in, any 20program established to provide apprenticeship or other
trammg.
Weber argued that the fact that he was a white male should not
change the analysis because Title VII had been interpreted so as to
proscribe racial discrimnataon in private employment against
whites on the same terms as racial discrimination against
16. Weber v. Kaiser Alummium & Chem. Corp., 415 F Supp. 761, 767 (E.D.
La. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, United Steelworkers, AFLCIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
17. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 225 (5th Cir.
1977), rev'd,United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
18. United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
20. Id-
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nonwhites.2 '
The Supreme Court acknowledged that a literal reading of Sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII might lead to the conclusion that
affirmative action efforts such as the one undertaken by Kaiser are
in conflict with the anti-discrimination principles of Title VII.
However, the Supreme Court noted that "a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because [it is] not
within [the statute's] spirit nor within the intention of its makers."22 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stressed that
these provisions,
should be read against the background of the legislative history of Title
Congress'
VII and the historical context from which the Act arose.
was with 'the plight of the Negro m our economy.'
primary concern
.'The crux of the problem was to open up employment opportunities
for Negros
in occupations which have been traditionally closed to
'23
them.
Thus, affirmative action, as one of the methods to reach this goal,
could not be totally prohibited.
It would be iromc indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over

centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those
who had 'been excluded from the American dream for so long,' constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race conto abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and
scions efforts
24
hierarchy.
After stressing that the spirit of the Act revealed more about
the permissiblility of voluntary affirmative action than its literal
reading, Justice Brennan went on to interpret Section 703(j) of the
Act as reading that a mere statistical imbalance in an employer's
work force can not be considered a sufficient condition to require
the employer to grant preferential treatment. 25 If Congress had desired to prohibit all voluntary affirmative action, it would have declared not only that an employer is not required to engage in
affirmative action to balance its work force, but also that Title VII
21. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201. Weber relied on McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976).

22. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201 (1979).
23. Id. at 201-03 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey)).
24. Id. at 204.
25. The relevant part of § 703(j) reads as follows:
nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to requzre an employer
to grantpreferentialtreatment to any individual or to any group
on account of an imbalance which may
or sex
because of race, color
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
in comparison with the total
color
or sex employed by any employer
in any
or sex
number or percentage of persons of such race, color
community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in
any community, State, section, or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (emphasis added).
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would not permzt an employer to do so. 26 Section 703(j), Justice
Brennan explained, was designed to avoid undue interference by
the Federal Government with private busmess.-' An interpretation
of Title VII that prohibits all voluntary affirmative action would
disservice this end, diminish traditional management prerogatives,
and at the same time impede the attainment of the ultimate statutory goals.28 Voluntary compliance with the ultimate goals and
objectives of Title VII was seen as a desired means to reach the congressional purpose of eliminating- the "last" vestiges of
discrimination. 29
In Johnson, the Supreme Court addressed the statutory validity of a sex-based affirmative action plan.3 0 In reviewing the composition of its work force, the Santa Clara Transportation Agency 3l
noted that women were underrepresented in both the agency as a
whole and in five of seven job catergories as compared to their proportional share of the county labor force. 32 Women were largely
concentrated in "traditional female jobs."33 The long-term goal of
the affirmative action plan was to attain a work force whose compo26. United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205 (1979).
27. Id. at 206-07.
28. Id. at 207.
29. Id. at 204.
30. For a general discussion of Johnson, see Belton, Reflections on Affirmative Action After Paradise and Johnson, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 115, 119-21
(1988); Buchanan, Johnson v. Transportation Agency Santa Clara County: A
Paradigmof Affirmative Action, 26 Hous. L. REv. 229 (1989); Buckley, supra
note 14, at 716-20; Rutherglen & Ortiz, supra note 14, at 478-83; 1987-1988 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrtmination Law, 30
B.C.L. REV. 99,271-82 (1988); The Supreme Cour4 1986 Term, 101 HARV.L. REV.
7, 300-10 (1987); Note, Johnson v. Transportation Agency: The United States
Supreme Court Weighs Statistical Imbalance -n Favor of Affirmative Action,
21 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 593-12 (1988) [hereinafter Note, StatisticalImbalance
7n Favor of Affirmative Action]; Note, Affirmative Action Affirmed" Johnson
v. ,Transportation Agency, Santa ClaraCounty, Californza,33 LoY. L. REV. 1121
(1988); Note, Civil Rights - Title VII- PublicEmployerMay Consuder Gender
to Promote Employee Without Violating Title VII of Civil-Rights Act of 1964
When Enforczng A Valid Affirmative Action Plan, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 455-68
(1987).
31. The Santa Clara County Transportation Agency is a public employer. A
public employer is not only subject to the requirements of Title VII, but is also
subject to the requirements of the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court
in Johnson,however, did not address the constitutional issue because it was not
raised or addressed in the litigation below. "Of course, where the issue is properly raised, public employers must justify the adoption and =mplementation for
a voluntary affirmative action plan under the Equal Protection Clause." Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.-616, 620 n.2
(1987).
32. Women made up 22.4% of the Agency employees, while they comprised
36.4% of the local labor force. Id. at 621.
33. Seventy-six percent of the women were working as office or clerical
workers, 7.1% were agency officials and administrators, 8.6% professionals,
9.7% technicians and 22% worked as service and maintenance workers. Id.
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sition reflected the proportion of women in the area labor force.-s
The Agency acknowledged that it was unrealistic to rely only on
long-term goals to provide the desired labor force composition because of the characteristics of its then present labor force, the structure of the Agency, and the availability of a small number of
qualified applicants for positions requiring specialized training and
experience. The affirmative action plan thus provided short-range
goals and annual adjustments. No specific number of positions
were set aside for women. The plan only authorized the consideration of sex as a factor to be taken into account when evaluating
qualified candidates for jobs in which women were poorly
represented. 35
In December, 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy for the
promotional positions of road dispatcher. Twelve employees applied for the promotion, including Ms. Joyce and Mr. Johnson.
Both were rated as well-qualified for the job. The Agency awarded
scores after reviewing their prior experience and conducting a first
interview. Joyce obtained a score of 73, while Johnson obtained a
score of 75. Another 5 employees scored above 70 on the interview
and were also certified as eligible for selection by the appointing
authority. After an intervention of the Agency's Affirmative Action Coordinator and a second interview, the Agency finally selected Joyce over Johnson.3 6 Johnson challenged the Agency's
decision, alleging that he was denied promotion on the basis of sex,
in violation of Title VII.
The District Court held that the County's affirmative action
plan was invalid, because the plan did not satisfy the criteria announced in Weber. The court found that the Agency failed to show
that its plan was temporary and remedial and therefore concluded
that the plan unnecessarily trammeled Johnson's interests in addition to creating an absolute bar to his promotion.3 7 However, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
38
affirmative action plan at issue fulfilled the Weber requirements.
The Supreme Court affirmed.3 9
Again, Justice Brennan wrote for the majority. The opinion reflects a continuing commitment to the underlying rationale of
34. Id. at 621-22. The Agency's aspiration was for a 36% female representation for the skilled craft worker positions. Id. at 622. The plan provided for
affirmative action for ethic minorities in a similar way. Id.
35. Id. at 622.
36. See 7d. at 623-24.
37. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County Cal., 770 F.2d
752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaning the district court's holding), qff'd, 480
U.S. 616 (1987).
38. Johnson, 770 F.2d at 752.
39. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616 (1987).
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Weber by the following- its rejection of "plain-language-of-the-statute" arguments; its acceptance of the legislative history indicating
Congressional intent that employers play a major role in eliminating vestiges of discrimination; and its reliance on the language of
Section 703(j), which reflects a strong desire to preserve managerial
prerogatives so that they might be used to combat discrimination. 40
Furthermore, Congress took no action to amend Title VII to
show dissatisfaction with the Court's interpretation in Weber. Recognizing that Congressional inaction might not always be an expression of Congressional approval, Justice Brennan nonetheless
concluded that the inaction had at least some significance in this
situation.
Weber
was a widely publicized decision that addressed a prominent
issue of public debate. Legislative inattention is thus not a plausible
explanation for Congressional inaction. Furthermore, Congress not
only passed no contrary legislation in the wake of Weber, but not one
legislator even proposed a bill to do so. The barriers of the legislative
process therefore also seem a poor explanation for failure to act. By
contrast, when Congress has been displeased with our interpretation of
41
Title VII, it has not hestitated to amend the statute to tell us so.
Any belief in the notion of a dialogue between the judiciary and the

legislature must acknowledge that on occasion an invitation declined is
as significant as one accepted. 42
B. Reaction to Weber and Johnson
Interpreting the Congressional intent which underlines the enactment of Title VII by reference to specific statements made by
40. See id. at 629 n.7.
41. Johnson,480 U.S. at 629 n.7. Justice Brennan referred to the passing of
the Pregnancy Discrimiation Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982), in which

Congress unambiguously expressed its disapproval with the Supreme Court's

holding and reasoning in General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629 n.7.
42. Id. See also .Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors:Keepzng Score
in the Affirmative Action Ballpark From Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C.L. REv. 1,
82 (1988).
Justice Brennan's argument, in Johnson, that Congressional inaction after
the Supreme Court's decision in Weber is illustrative of Congressional approval
of the Court's interpretation of Title VII, gains weight in light of the proposed,
but vetoed, Civil Rights Act of 1990. The proposal was a clear rejection of recent Supreme Court decisions which cut "back dramatically on the scope and
the effectiveness of civil rights protections." The proposed Act states expressly
that one of its purposes is "to respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions
by restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those
decisions." See §§ 2(a)(1), (b)(1) of the House Version of the proposed Civil
Rights Act 1990, vetoed by President Bush. H.R. 4000, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. H9552-55 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990).
Justice Brennan made the same argument in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 190-99 (1989). The majority in Patterson,however, refused
to rely on this argument. Instead, the Court noted that "Congressional inaction
cannot amend a duly enacted statute." Id. at 175 n.1.
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various members of Congress can easily lead to opposing viewpoints. 43 The divergent references to the legislative history in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Weber and Johnson make this
clear." "Statutory interpretation," becomes "a tricky business" indeed, 45 especially when one takes into account that the 1964 legislature did not debate "the question of the propriety of affirmative
action programs."46
The ambiguity is further enhanced by the apparent conflict between the specific requirements imposed on employers and the
overarching, ultimate goals of Title VII to improve the economic
status of "traditionally disadvantaged groups," including minorities
and women. 47 The Johnson and Weber opinions concentrated on
the spirit of the Act and on the ultimate goal Congress wanted to
reach. 48 Different theories of interpretation of Title VII can lead to
opposite conclusions about the meaning and reguirements imposed
by Title VII and the latitude granted to employers to engage in affirmative action. The dissenting opinions in Weber and Johnson focused on a literal reading of the text of Title VII and stressed the
incompatibility of purely private voluntary affirmative action with
the Act's literal language when there is no proof of prior employer
43. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 8.
44. For a discussion of the differing interpretations of Title VII, see Cox,

The Supreme Cour4 Title VII and "Voluntary" Affirmative Action - A Critique, 21 IND. L. REv. 767, 852-88 (1988). Then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent mn
Weber is a clear example of the different interpretations of Title VII's legislative history. In Ins dissent, Rehnquist criticized Justice Brennan's selective
reading of the Act's legislative history and stated that "[w]hen read in context,
becomes clear." United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
the meaning
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 229 n.11 (1979) (Rehnquest, J., dissenting).
45. Boyd, supra note 14, at 7.
46. Gould, supra note 14, at 653-54, n.245. See, Kreiling & Mercuro, supra
note 14, at 57; Schatzki, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An Exercise
in UnderstandableIndectsion, 56 WASH. L. REv. 51, 66-67 (1980); Note, Racial
Quota, supra note 14, at 253. ContraCox, supra note 44, at 867-68 (Cox argues
that Congress did at least consider the basic features of affirmative action).
When debating the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the legislature approved numerous decisions that had provided for court-ordered affirmative action relief.
See W. GOULD, supra note 6, at 99; Gould, supra note 14, at 653-54 n.245.
47. See Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concep4 Employment Discrzmznation, and Legislative Intent The Fallacyof Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 99, 119 (1983).
48. See Belton, supra note 14, at 591; Blumrosen, supra note 47, at 117-32;
Daly, supra note 42, at 81; Selig, Affirmative Action in Employment: The Legacy of a Supreme Court Maority,63 IND. L.J. 301, 356 (1987); Note, Statistical
Imbalancein Favor of Affirmative Action, supra note 30, at 611-12.
For a general discussion of statutory interpretation and, specifically, about
the use of "intent" and "spirit of the Act" in interpreting a statute, see Blatt,
The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6
CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 811, 813-15 (1985). See also Greenberger, Civil Rights and
the Politics of Statutory Interpretation,63 U. COLO. L. REv. 37-78 (1991).
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discrinnation. 49
Additionally, the Weber Court and the Johnson majority argued that Title VII intended to leave managerial prerogatives untouched to the greatest extent possible. Congress rooted this policy
not in Title VII, but m the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).5°
Commentators have argued that this policy can not simply be transplanted to Title VII, because Title VII, unlike the NLRA, directly
regulates the employment relationslp. 51 The Weber Court and the
Johnson majority, however, did not argue. for a wholesale transportation of the principles of employer (and umon) freedom into Title
VII, but rather argued for a selective incorporation to the extent
otherwise compatible with the Title VII dictates. Title VII certainly
does not leave the employment relationship untouched. Title VII
explicitly prohibits the employer from grounding employment decisions and practices on a limited number of forbidden criteria. Title
VII does not convert the whole system of employment decisions
into a purely merit based system. So long as the employer's decision does not rely overtly or covertly 5 2 on any of the enumerated
criteria, Title VII shields the employer from liabilitity. Although
the prohibition on the use of the impermissible criteria should not
be construed narrowly,5 3 Title VII can not fairly be read as a statute
that leaves the employer with no more than that which he is explicitly allowed to do. The employer's freedom of decision making
under Title VII is preserved, unless it is taken away. s5
49. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 669-77 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 226-30 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also
Walker, supra note 3.
50. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). See California
Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608 (1980) ("Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 against the backdrop of this Nation's longstanding labor policy of leaving to the chosen representative of employers and employees the freedom through collective bargaining to establish conditions of employment
applicable to a particular business or industrial environment"). See also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249-50 (1989) (plurality opinion); Gould,
The Supreme Court and Employment DiscrimnationLaw %n 1989: Judiczal
Retreat and CongressionalResponse, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1485, 1500 (1990).
51. See Rutherglen & Oritz, supra note 14, at 473, 505-06.
52. Here, the term "covert" not only includes intentional decision making,
but also includes decision making on the basis of neutral criteria having a disparate impact. Decision making on the basis of disparate impact criteria is the
functional equivalent of intentional decision making.
53. Employer liability for discriminatory employment practices under the
theory of disparate impact is an example of a broad interpretation of the prohibition on the use of impermassible criteria.
54. An argument could be advanced that the Supreme Court's analytical
framework developed to establish Title VII violations itself reduces the scope of
the employer's managerial prerogatives. Although the McDonnel Douglas Burdine framework only asks the employer to "articulate" a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (burden of production, and not persuasion) to rebut-the inference of discrimination created by a plaintiff's prma facze case, it
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When Congress enacted Title VII, it intended to create employment opportunities for disadvantaged groups.s5 To reach this end,
Congress spoke m terms of color- and sex-blindness and equality of
treatment. 56 However, these are only means to reach an end. "In
the case of a comprehensive statute such as the Civil Rights Act, a
court should focus on the overall purpose of the Act." 57 This is not
to say that the end always justifies the means used. The Supreme
Court's approval of affirmative action as a means to reach the ultimate purpose of Title VII is not an unconditional acceptance of all
kinds of affirmative action efforts. Limits and restrictions do exist.
Even opponents of affirmative action should bear m mind that
"since 1978 the Court has unambiguously interpreted [Title VII] to
permit the voluntary adoption of special programs to benefit members of the minority groups for whose protection the statute was
enacted."5 8 In his concurrence m Johnson, Justice Stevens stated:
the only problem for me is whether to adhere to an authoritative construction of the Act that is at odds with my understanding of the actual
intent of the authors of the legislation. I conclude without hesitation
that I must answer that question in the affirmative
Bakke and Weber have been decided and are now an zmportantpart of

the fabrc of our law. This is sufficiently compelling to adhere to the
basic construction of the legislation that the Court adopted in Bakke
and in Weber There is an undoubtedpublic interestin 'stabilityand
orderly development of the law.' 9

Many employers have relied on the Supreme Court's decisions
upholding affirmative action plans and have supported the effort to
create equal opportunities for disadvantaged groups.60 Overruling
Weber and Johnson would create great instability m labor-managenonetheless asks for a justification of the employer's decision. Requiring an
employer to articulate a reason when it intends to discharge an employee, a

reason that must be both legitimate and nondiscriminatory at the same time,
will restrain the employer from exercising its managerial freedom to the fullest
extent. Conceivably, a situation may arise where an employer, who did not base
its decision on one of the impermissible criteria under Title VII, cannot produce
a justification for its decision that sounds credible to the court or that can withstand a plaintiff's "pretext" argument. In this borderline situation (border between clear violations of Title VII and those cases where the existence of a
legitimate nondiscrimmatory reason is "beyond doubt") the employer's freedom
of action will be severely limited by the fear of incurring liability.
55. See Cox, supra note 44, at 866-67.
56. See Blunrosen, supra note 47, at 119.
57. Blumrosen, supra note 47, at 121.
58. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 644 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. See Gould, supra note 14, at 654. See also Note, Rethinkzng Weber:
Business Response to Affirmative Action, 102 HARv.L. REv. 658-71 (1989) (The
author argues that even private businesses resisted the attack by the Reagan
Administration on affirmative action. The executives preferred affirmative action as a familiar and useful method of self-evaluation).
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ment affairs. Predictability and stability remain important values
6
that the law should pursue. '
C.

Lsmstations on Affirmative Action

The Supreme Court's acceptance of voluntary affirmative action plans in Weber and Johnson was not unconditional. Although
the Court explicitly refused to draw a clear line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans, the
Court explained why it considered the particular plans at issue to
be permissible under Title VII.6 2 Lower courts considering the validity of affirmative action plans should rely on the guidance offered by the two Supreme Court cases.
The Weber Court held that the affirmative action plan at issue
fell "within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private
sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to
eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated
job catergores."6 3 The purpose of the plan thus mirrored the purpose of Title VII. At the same tine, the Court found that the plan
did not put an undue burden on the interests of the white employees at the plant:
the plan does not unnecessarilytrammel the interest of the white employees. The plan does not require the discharge of white employees

and theirreplacementwith new black hirees. Nor does the plan create
an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees... Moreover,
61. The Supreme Court recently underlined the importance of stare decisis,
especially in the area of statutory construction. In Pattersonv. Mclean Credit
Unwn, the Court stated
Although we have cautioned that 'stare dectss is a principle of policy and
not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision'
it is indisputable that stare dectss is a basic principle within the Judicial Branch,
which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of faslonmng and
preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon 'arbitrary
discretion'.
Our precedents are not sacrosanct, for we have overruled prior decisions
where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established
Nonetheless, we have held that 'any departurefrom the doctrne of stare
deczszs demands special3ustification.'
We have also said that the burden borne by the party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory
construction. Consderationsofstare decists have spectalforcein the areas
of statutory interpretation,for here, unlike in the context of constitutional
interpretation, the legislative power is implicated and Congress remains
free to alter what we have done.
491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (emphasis added). See Daly, supra note 42, at 80-87;
Selig, supra note 48, at 368. See also The Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's
Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970). For a discussion of The Boys Markets, see Gould, On Labor In.7unctions, Unions, and Judges: The Boys Market
Case, 1970 Sup CT. REV. 215, 225-32.
62. See United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979).
63. Id. at 209.
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the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintainracial
balance, but simply to eliminate a mansfest racial zmbalance. Preferential selection
will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled
craftworkers in the Gramercy64plant approximates the percentage of
blacks in the local labor force.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court first examined whether the
decision to promote Joyce was "made pursuant to a plan prompted
by concerns similar to those of the employer in Weber "65 The
manifest imbalance that existed in the employer's work force reflected an underrepresentation of women in traditionally segregated job categories. This manifest imbalance justified why the
employer took the sex of the applicant into account for making its
promotional decision. 66 The employer made the employment decision pursuant to a plan that was intended to remedy
67
underrepresentation.
The Supreme Court then considered whether the plan at issue
did unnecessarily trammel the rights of male employees or created
an absolute bar to their advancement.68 The plan did not set aside
any positions for women. No person was automatically excluded
from consideration for the promotion. The sex of the applicant was
just one of the numerousfactors taken into account for making the
decision.6 9 The promotion, made according to the plan, did not unsettle any legitimate firmly rooted expectations, because nobody
could show an absolute entitlement to the promotion. The applicant selected possessed the necessary qualifications for the job and
the rejected applicant retained his job with the Agency and remained eligible for other promotions.70 Furthermore, the Agency
intended to attain a balanced work force, not to maintain one. The
lack of an explicit end date in the plan did not make the plan invalid. "Express assurance that a program is only temporary may be
necessary if the program actually sets aside positions according to
specific numbers." 71

II. THREE PRONG ANALYSIS FOR ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS
The assessment of the validity of an affirmative action plan
under Title VII requires the same inquiry whether dealing with
64. Id. at 208-09 (emphasis added).
65. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 631 (1987).
66. Id. at 632.
67. Id. at 634.
68. Id. at 637-38.
69. Id. at 638.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 639-40.
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race- or sex-based affirmative action plans. 7 2 While Weber upheld
an affirmative action plan for racial minorities, Johnson applied the
same analysis to a sex-based affirmative action plan. 73
The Supreme Court appears to describe its analysis as a two
part inquiry. First, the Court considers whether the employer has a
justification for undertaking an affirmative action effort. Second,
the Court then considers the implications or burdens of the plan for
the rights of those who are not beneficiaries. When the plan creates
an absolute bar to the advancement of the white males, it makes
race and/or sex the only factor upon which the exclusion is based,
contrary to the provisions of Title VII. The Court also determines
whether white males have any absolute entitlements or rights encroached upon by the plan.
Apart from the considerations that deal directly with the rights
of the non-beneficiaries of the plan, the Court looks at a number of
characteristics of the affirmative action plan itself: such as the
plan's goals, temporariness, and remedial nature. Although this
last inquiry clearly relates as well to the burden prong as to the
justification prong, it seems appropriate to distinguish this inquiry
as a separate and third prong. The third prong can not be reduced
to either of the other parts of the inquiry.
The Court's inquiry into the legality of an employer's decision
to institute an affirmative action plan compares to a medical review
72. The constitutional analysis demands a double inquiry that differs from
the statutory analysis. The test to determine the constitutionality of a raceconscious affirmative action plan under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is the strict scrutiny test. See City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986). The Supreme Court applies the same standard of review for benign or
remedial racial classifications as for classifications that are motivated by illegitimate notions of racial Aferiority. Strick scrutiny is applied because racial classifications are regarded as inherently suspect across the board. See City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, supra, at 490-91. Gender-based classifications, however, do not share this characteristic with race-based classifications.
Gender-based classifications are not suspect, but only quasi-suspect classifications. See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468
(1981) (denial of treating gender-based classifications as inherently suspect in
prior cases). They are not subject to the strictest level of scrutiny, but to an
intermediate level only. Under the middle level of scrutiny, the gender-based
classification "must serve an 'mlportant governmental nterest and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (emphasis added). The level of scrutiny applied to benign
sex classifications, such as affirmative action plans for women should only mirror and definitively not be higher than the level of scrutiny applied to sex-based
classifications grounded in overbroad and stereotypical generalizations about
the characteristics and abilities of the members of the female sex. A middle
level of scrutiny should suffice. See, e.g., L.D. Mattson, Inc. v. Multnomah
County, 703 F Supp. 66 (D.C. Or. 1988).
73. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 631. See also La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1982);
Boyd, supra note 14, at 55.
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board's review of a medical doctor's diagnosis and treatment of a
patient. In the first instance the doctor (employer) screens the allegedly sick person (work force) to detect any diseases. A few sore
muscles (absence of a manifest imbalance) can not be regarded as a
disease for which a cure is appropriate. However, if a more serious
malfunction (manifest unbalance) exists, medication might be appropriate. The goal then becomes to cure the patient's problem
(creation of balanced work force), even though there might be a
slight chance that health might be regained without any medical
interference at all (Title VII does not requtre a balanced work
force, but allows the employer under the appropriate circumstances
to engage in affirmative action). The doctor then considers the
remedies. While considering the appropriate remedies, the doctor
looks at the disease and the implications the proposed medication
has for other parts or organs of the body (rights of white male majority that might be implicated). A doctor does not cut off an arm to
get rid of a finger injury. Diagnosis (justification prong), remedies
(remedial nature prong), and implications (burden prong) remain
distinct, but at the same time closely interrelated.
Although Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Weber,
explicitly refused to define the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans, the Court in Johnson refers to the Weber requirements as constituting the
components of the Title VII inquiry into the vadility of voluntary
affirmative action plans.74 Lower courts uniformly adopted the
Weber scheme of analysis. 75
74. See Johnson,480 U.S. at 628-30.
75. See, e.g., United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438,
1448-49 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment
Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1500 (11th Cir. 1988), aff'd, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989); Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S.
1036 (1988); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356-58 (9th Cir. 1987), cert
dented, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1304
(D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Lilly v. City of Beckley,
W Va., 797 F.2d 191, 194 (4th Cir. 1986); Bratton v. South Bend Community
School Corp., 775 F.2d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated, 819 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.
1987); Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514,1533-34 (11th Cir. 1985), qff'd, 480 U.S.
149 (1987); Bushey v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 733 F.2d 220, 228 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert dented, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d
878, 883 (6th Cir. 1983); La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982);
Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys., 651 F.2d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 1981); Bridgeport
Firebird Soc'y v. City of Bridgeport, 686 F Supp. 53,60 (D. Conn. 1988); Smith v.
Harvey, 648 F Supp. 1103, 1107 (M.D. Fla. 1986); United States v. New Jersey,
614 F Supp. 387, 394-95 (D.N.J. 1985); Breschard v. Directors Guild, 34 BNA
FEP Cas. 1045,1049 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Cohen v. Community College, 484 F Supp.
411, 434-35 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 480 F Supp. 539, 546
(D. Nev. 1979), aff'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert dented, 456 U.S. 916
(1982).
In Johnson, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Title VII requirements for a valid affirmative action plan are not as stringent as those unposed
by the Constitution. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,
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Justification: The Manifest Imbalance Requirement7 6

Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans to Redress Societal
Discrimination

The affirmative action plan m Weber was justifiable because its
purpose mirrored the purpose of Title VII. Both were aimed at
opening up employment opportunities for blacks "in occupations
which have been traditionally closed to them." 77 The plan falls
within the area of discretion that Title VII leaves to private employers to voluntarily adopt plans designed to eliminate conspicuousracial imbalances in traditionallysegregatedjob categories.78 Weber
failed to explicity resolve the question whether and to what extent
the employer that started up the affirmative action, plan was justified to do so only if it had itself, at least passively - as part of industry wide discriminatory practices - been engaged in employment
discrimination. While footnoting the wide-spread racial exclusionary practices in the steel industry,79 the Court declined to follow
Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 627 n.6 (1987). See also Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d 1000,
1011 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 560 (1989); Ledoux v. District of
Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va., 797 F.2d 191, 192 (4th Cir. 1986); Bratton
v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 888 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. City &
County of San Francisco, 696 F Supp. 1287,1301 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modified, 890
F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989); Dougherty v. Barry, 607 F. Supp. 1271, 1286 (D.C.
1985), vacated zn part, 869 F.2d 605 (1989); Britton v. South Bend Community
School Corp., 593 F Supp. 1223, 1229 (N.D. Ind. 1984), affl'd, 775 F.2d 794 (7th
Cir. 1985). Some have advanced the argument that the constitutional analysis
of affirmative action plans should be governed by the analysis under Title VII.
See Note, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans by Public Employers: The Disparity in Standards Between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, 56
FORDHAM L. REv. 403-30 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Disparity zn Standards].
The argument runs that Congress exercised its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it extended the coverage of Title VII to public employers. '"he manifest imbalance of Title VII reflects Congress' considered
choice; it should be the constitutional standard applied to the states under the
equal protection clause." Id. at 430. See also Buckley, supra note 14, at 720;
Buchanan, supra note 30, at 238; oDaly, supra note 42, at 88-91. It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will follow this route in light of its explicit statement in Johnson about the difference between the two standards.
76. The first prong of the constitutional analysis requires 'more" a
compelling interestof the governmental actorinvolved. The governmental unit
that wants to introduce an affirmative action plan must have a strong basis in
evidence that remedial action is necessary to remedy the present effects of its
own past discrimination. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
500 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). See also
Buckley, supra note 14, at 713-14; Edwards, supra note 5, at 777-78 and 783-84;
Selig, supra note 48, at 347-48; Note, Disparity in Standards,supra note 75, at
418-19; Note, Finding a "Manifest Imbalance"- The Case for a Unified
StatisticalTestfor Voluntary Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 87 MCH.L.
REv.1986, 1992-94 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Manifest Imbalance].
77. United Steelworkers, AFJ-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210 (1979).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 200 n.1 ("Judicial findings of exclusion from crafts on racial

grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial
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the "arguable violation" approach suggested by Justice Blackmun's
concurrence. Justice Blackmun would have allowed an employer to
initiate an affirmative action plan if there was at least some indication that the employer might have engaged in discriminatory practices in violation of Title VII, without requiring the employer to
actually produce evidence of a Title VII violation.8 0 Justice Blackmun interpreted the majority's approach as considering a job category as traditionally segregated when there has been a societal
history of purposeful exclusion of blacks from the job category involved.8 1 However, for a number of practical and equitable reasons,
Justice Blackmun accepted the broader approach taken by the
82
majority.
Weber failed to clarify what a "manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories" represented. Did the Supreme
Court define the first prong of the analysis of the validity of a voluntary affirmative action plan as requiring a double justification?
Is the employer forced to show both a manifest imbalance m his
work force and also that the job categories implicated by the affirmative action plan reflect an imbalance due to traditional segregation? What does "traditional segregation" mean?
The Supreme Court clarified its position in Johnson. The fact
that the employer took sex into account in its decision making process remained justifiable by a manifest imbalance in its work force.
The manifest imbalance reflected underrepresentation of women in
traditionally segregated job categories. The Supreme Court noted
that the requirement that a manifest imbalance relate to a traditionally segregated job category provides "assurance both that sex
or race will be taken into account in a manner consistent with Title
VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of employment discrimnanotice"). See also Buckley, supra note 14, at 715-16; Cox, supra note 14, at 101;
Note, Societal Discrimination,supra note 14, at 315.
80. Justice Blackmun stressed the fact that, although the Kaiser company
had made some efforts to recruit minority employees, its insistence that those
lired have five years prior industrial experience might reflect the use of a hiring practice "that arguably was not sufficiently job related to justify under Title
VII any discriminatory impact it may have had." United Steelworkers, AFLCIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,212 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also
Belton, supra note 14, at 585-586; Meltzer, supra note 3, at 443-44, 447-56; Note,
Manifest Imbalance,supra note 76, at 1996-97.
81. See United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 212
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
82. Justice Blackmun recognized that none of the parties involved in a voluntary affirmative action plan has any incentive to prove an arguable Title VII
violation. To make the standard work, it would have to be set low enough to
permit the employer to prove it without obligating himself to pay a damages
award. In practice, this would probably lead to an approach that would not differ much from the statistical imbalance approach adopted by the majority. He
found an additional advantage in the majority approach as it "would permit private affirmative action to reach where Title VII itself does not." Id. at 214-15.
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tion, and that the interests of those employees not benefitting from
the plan will not be unduly infringed."83 Although the Supreme
Court mentioned the relationship between the imbalance and the
traditional segregation requirement, the emphasis clearly focuses
on the manifest unbalance. The affirmative action plan must remedy underrepresentation. The employer need not point to .its own
prior discriminatory practices,84 nor show any purposeful discriminatory practices in the industry at large. It remains sufficient for
the employer to intend to redress an underrepresentation of women
caused by strong traditional social pressures against female participation in employment.1s

The Supreme Court embraced the idea that Title VII empowers
a private employer to voluntarily undertake affirmative steps to
remedy the effects of societal discrimination.8 6 Societal discrimmation comprises all forms of discriminatory practices not attributable
83. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 631 (1987).
84. Id.
85. See -u. at 634 n.12. Arguably, more than just societal pressure was keeping Ms. Joyce from a road dispatcher job, although the Supreme Court did not
seem to note it. One member of the three person interview panel that established the scores of the applicants for promotion had earlier described Joyce as
a "rebel-rousing, skirt-wearing person." This is precisely the type of sexist remark by a person involved in the decision making process on which a plaintiff
can rely to establish that sex might have played a role in the employer's
decison. See Price Waterhousev. Hopkzns, 490 U.S..228 (1989). See also Becker,
Price Charming: Abstract Equality, 5 SuP CT. REv. 201, 206 (1987) ("Giving
Joyce an edge over Johnson at the end of the promotion process is affirmative
The notion that
action only if Johnson and Joyce were similarly situated.
they might have been similarly situated is fanciful").
86. See Allegretti, supra note 14, at 789-92; Boyd, supra note 14, at 15;
Buchanan, supra note 30, at 264-65; Daly, supra note 42, at 25-26; KIeiling &
Mercurio, supra note 14, at 63; Meltzer, supra note 3, at 462; Selig, supra note
48, at 341; The Supreme Cour4 1986 Term, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 307 (1987); Note,
StatisticalImbalance in Favor of Affirmative Action, supra note 30, at 609;
Note, Manifest Imbalance,supra note 76, at 1999-2003; Note, Societal Discrimination,supranote 14, at 307, 323-24. ContraRutherglen & Oritz, supra note 14,
at 482-83, 487.
An expression of the view that the Supreme Court in Johnson permits an
employer to redress the effects of societal discrimination can be found in Justice

Scalia's dissenting opinion in Johnson:

The most significant proposition of law established by today's decision is
that racial or sexual discrimination is permitted under Title VII when it is
zntended to overcome the effect not of the employer's own discrimination,
but of societal attitudes that have limited the entry of certain races, or of a
particular sex, into certain jobs.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 663
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Scalia added, "it is the alteration of social attitudes, rather than the elimination of discrimination, which
today's decision approves as justification for state-enforced discrimination." Id.
at 666 (emphasis added). See also United Steelworkers; AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193,210 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Breshchard v. Directors Guild, 34 BNA FEP Cas. 1045, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
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to an identified perpetrator.8 7 In Johnson, the Supreme Court
clearly supported the idea that the employer should neither establish proof of its own discriminatory practices, nor try to draw an
inference by establishing a prmafacte violation of Title VII. Nor
did the Supreme Court require any specific evidence of "traditional
segregation" m the job category concerned. The Court relied on the
acknowledgment in the employer's affirmative action plan that
"limited opportunities have existed in the past," for women to find
employment in certain job classifications "where women have not
been traditionally employed in significant numbers."8 8
The traditional segregation characteristic of the job category involved does not seem to be an independent requirement.8 9 It may
be assumed, pursuant to Johnson,that this part of the manifest imbalance test is satisfied whenever an employer shows that the imbalance in its work force is not just a temporary or occassional one,
but is a lasting one. 9° An employer willing to redress an ongoing
inbalance in its work force should not be foreclosed from doing so
merely because it is unable to produce evidence of traditional patterns of occupational race or sex segregation in its workplace. 9'
This would be mconsistent with the limited burden of proof both
Weber and Johnson impose on the employer and with the emphasis
87. See Note, Societal Discrtmination,supra note 14, at 297-99, 307. See
also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 287 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); W. GOULD, supra note 6, at
92.
88. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 633 (1987).
89. As Justice White observed in Johnson:
My understanding of Weber was, and is, that the employer's plan did not
violate Title VII because it was designed to remedy intentional and systematic exclusion of blacks by the employer and the unions from certain job
categories. That is how I understood the phrase "traditionally segregated
jobs" we used in that case. The Court now interprets it to mean nothing
more than a manifest imbalance between one identifiable group and another in an employer's labor force.
Id. at 657 (White, J., dissenting).
See also Daly, supra note 42, at 25 ("To view Johnson simply as a reaffirmation of Weber in the context of gender discrimination is misleading.
The first
alteration consisted of the collapsing of the second part of the Weber formula,
'in traditionally segregated job categories,' into the first part, 'manifest inbalance.' ").
The "traditional segregated job category" requirement has some bite only if
it requires an employer to make comparisons between the composition of the
relevant labor market, on the one hand, and the composition of the specific job
categories for which it wants to start up an affirmative action plan, on the other.
An unspecified comparison with its work force at large might not suffice.
90. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 13; 1987-1988 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrmznation Law, 30 B.C.L. REV. 99, 271, 273 n.15
(1988).
91. See Kreiling & Mercuro, supra note 14, at 60 ("The courts have been
flexible in not requiring a demonstration of a traditionally segregated job cate-
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the Supreme Court put on voluntary pursuit of Title VII's goal of
eliminating the last vestiges of employment discrimination in the
workplace. 92
The fact that an imbalance exists in what one can describe as a
"traditional white and/or male job category" remains acceptable as
a sufficient justification to institute an affirmative action plan,93 regardless of whether the imbalance results from occupational segregation or is the result of the pressures of society at large. 94
Court
2. Identifying the Manfest Imbalance - "The Supreme
'95 "
Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away
From Johnston to Johnson
One reason why the Supreme Court upheld the affirmative action plan in Weber was that the plan was designed to eliminate a
conspwcuous or manfest racial zmbalance in the employer's work
gory"); Vaughn, supra note 3, at 560 ("failure to demonstrate 'traditional segre-

gation' will not be fatal to an otherwise-valid plan").

"Newer" jobs, such as those in the computer industry, should not be excluded from the field in which voluntary affirmative action can operate. See
Kreiling & Mercurio, supra note 14, at 60. See also Meltzer, supra note 3, at 459;
Note, StatisticalImbalance In Favor Of Affirmative Action, supra note 30, at
608.
92. See Kreiling & Mercurio, supra note 14, at 60.
93. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 637 n.14 (1987).
94. See Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See Boyd, supra note 14, at 13; Buchanan,
supra note 30, at 235; Cox, supra note 44, at 794; Daly, supra note 42, at 26;
Kreiling & Mercurio, supra note 14, at 60; Vaughn, supra note 3, at 560; 19871988 Annual Survey ofLabor Relations and Employment Discrtm nation Law,
30 B.C.L. REv. 99, 271, 280-81 (1988).
Some courts correctly stress the existence of a manifest unbalance as satisfying the first prong of the Title VII analysis. See, .e.g., Shidaker v. Tisch, 833
F.2d 627, 630 n.4 (7th Cir. 1986), cert dented, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988); Higgins v.
City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denzed, 489 U.S. 1051
(1989); Sester v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968 (8th Cir. 1981); Lehman v.
Yellow Freight Sys., 651 F.2d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. CW Transport,
Inc., 658 F Supp. 1278 (W.D. Wis 1987); Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 480 F
Supp. 539, 546-47 (D. Nev. 1979), aff'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert dented,
456 U.S. 916 (1982). Other courts seem to require not only proof of a manifest
unbalance, but also independent proof of the "traditional segregation" characteristic of the job categories unplicated by the affirmative action plan. See, e.g.,
Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 75 n.1, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denzed, 486 U.S.
1036 (1988); Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va., 797 F.2d 191, 194 (4th Cir. 1986); La
Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982); Hunter v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry Co., 639 F.2d 424,426 (8th Cir. 1981); Jurgens v. Thomas, 29 BNA
FEP Cas. 1561, 1583 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F Supp. 1149, 1166-67 n.81 (M.D. Pa.1982). Also, many opinions sunply do not address the "traditional segregation" requirement at all. See
Vaughn, supra note 3, at 560.
95. Title borrowed from Hernandez, Title VII v. Senzority: "The Supreme
Court Giveth and The Supreme Court Taketh Away", 35 Am.U.L. REv. 339

(1986).

The John MarshallLaw Revew

[Vol. 24:731

force. 96 However, the Court failed to clarify how an employer can
establish an unbalance sufficient to justify the introduction of an
affirmative action plan nor explained how much of an unbalance is
required. The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson brought some
clarification. The Court pointed out the necessary comparisons:
In determining whether an imbalance exists that would justify taking
sex or race into account, a comparson of the percentage of msnorities
or women in the employer's work force with the percentages in the
area labor market or general population is appropriate in analyzing
jobs thatrequzre no specialexpertise
or trasnngprogramsdesigned
to provide expertise
Where a job requiresspecial training,however, the comparison should be 9with
those in the laborforce who pos7
sess the relevant qualifications.

In order to find out if a manifest unbalance exists, the employer first must determine whether the jobs for which it wants to
start up an affirmative action plan are jobs that require special qualification or training.98 The employer then must compare its actual
96. See United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC V Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979).
97. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 631 (1987) (emphasis added).
98. Although the Supreme Court, m Johnson,declared that the comparison
had to be made with the percentage of minorities or women in the employer's
work force; it is safer for the employer intending to institute an affirmative
action plan, to compare with the composition of the specific job categories of its
work force for which it wants to intreduce its plan. In Weber, the comparison
was made with the percentage of minority employees in the craft labor force
alone, and not with the overall percentage of minority employees in Kaiser's
work force, which was significantly higher. Of the craft work force, 1.83% was
black, United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99
(1979), compared to 14.8% of the total work force, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminu
& Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd,
United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Johnson
made a comparison both with the specific job category at issue and with the
overall composition of the work force. In its conclusion on the justification
prong of the analysis, the Supreme Court, however, relied on "the obvious mibalance in the Skilled Craft category" in which the promotion of Ms. Joyce was
made. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 637 (1987). Additional support for the comparison with the specific job category can be found in the Supreme Court's reiteration of the "traditional segregated job category" requirement. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637.
Most lower courts refer to statistical data concerning the job categories implicated by the affirmative action plan. See Shidaker v. Tisch, 833 F.2d 627, 631
(7th Cir. 1986) (comparing the percentages of minorities in upper and lower
level positions for a promotion from within), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988);
Hammon v. Barry, 826, F.2d 73, 74-75 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stress on job categories),
cert denied, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356
(9th Cir. 1987) (satisfied with a comparison with the city's work force in general,
but added that the required imbalance also existed in the fire department more
in specific), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Ledoux v. District of Columbia,
820 F.2d 1293, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (comparing the area labor market to the
racial and sexual composition of the work force in the higher-level positions at
issue), vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. City & County of
San Fransciso, 696 F Supp. 1287, 1304 n.36 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (would compare
imbalances in all job categories to representation n the general population),
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work force to the potential work force. If the jobs in question require special skills and training, the employer must compare the
percentage of minority or female employees already working in
these positions at the company with the percentage of qualifiedminority or female employees in the area labor market. 9 "Potential"
employees who lack the required skills to perform the jobs must be
exluded from the comparison. When the employer institutes an affirmative action plan for an unskilled position, it is allowed to compare the percentage of minority or female workers in its work force
with the minority or female representation in the general labor
market or the area labor market.1° ° Training programs set up to
acquire the necessary credentials to perform skilled jobs require
the same analysis. 101
Concerning the imbalance required to justify a voluntary affirmative action plan, the Supreme Court declared only that it need
not be sufficient to support a pnma facte case against the employer.'0 2 A gross imbalance in the work force sufficient to make
out a prma facte case allows the inference of direct employment
discrimination by a particular employer. 0 3 As was stated in Teamster's,1° 4 a statistical comparison between an employer's work force
and the general population remains highly probative when the jobs
involved fail to require any specific skills, or only require skills that
are readily acquirable. 0 5 On the other hand, in Hazelwood'° 6 the
Court asserted, "When special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to
the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value."'10 7 The basis for inferring
employer discrimination from statistical imbalances in the work
force is the assumption that "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to
be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring will in time result in a
work force more or less representative of the racial and ethmc composition of the population in the community from which the emmodified, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989). See also Note, Manifest Imbalance,
supra note 76, at 2007-08 n.85.

99. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 631 (1987).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988);
Dothard, Director Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Gnggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
104. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
105. Id. at 341-42.
106. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
107. Id. at 308 n.13.
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ployees are hired."1 08 Statistical inbalances are "often a telltale
sign of purposeful discrmmation."'10 9
The Supreme Court's distinction of the probative value attached to different comparisons makes sense when the ultimate
purpose of the comparisons is to infer employer discrimination.
The employer is liable for employment discrimination under Title
VII when it discriminates on the basis of race, sex or any other impermissible criterion. L0 However, the employer is not engaging m
prohibited discrinination when it excludes unqualified workers
from its work force. The statistics from which the inferences of discrimmation are drawn should, thus, not comprise of those workers
the employer can lawfully refuse to employ because of the absence
of the required qualifications to perform the job satifisfactorily."'1
When the Johnson Court established the comparisons employers must use to discover a manifest imbalance for justifying the introduction of an affirmative action plan, the Court relied heavily on
statistical data and its probative value in proving specific and direct
unlawful employer discrimination. The Supreme Court considered
the Teamster's approach as controlling when affirmative action
plans involve unskilled jobs. However, when skilled jobs are at issue, the Hazelwood comparison has to be made. 112 Reliance on the
Hazelwood comparison with the qualified relevant labor market
seems to be inapposite in the context of voluntary affirmative
action.
The Johnson Court clearly supported the idea that voluntary
affirmative action by private employers must not be discouraged by
requiring them to establish a pnma facze case of discrimination to
108. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20
(1977).
109. Id.
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
111. See Note, ManifestImbalance,supra note 76, at 2021. In Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, the Supreme Court required the plaintiff in a disparate
impact case to prove more than mere statistical imbalances in an employer's
work force in order to prevail. The plaintiff must in the first place identify the
specific employment practice that is alleged to have a disproportionate impact
on minorities or women. Then the plaintiff has to prove a causal connection
between the employment practice and the disparities in the composition of the
work force. In addition, the disparities have to be substantial. Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988). See also Ward Cove Packing
Co. v. Atomo, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989). The Supreme Court also declared that
the inevitable focus on statistics might put undue pressure on employers. An
employer cannot be held liable for just any disparity in its work force because
"it is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimination is the sole
cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs." Watson, 487 U.S. at 992. The
Supreme Court thought it equally unrealistic "to suppose that employers can
eliminate, or discover and explain, the myriad of [sic] innocent causes that may
lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work forces." Id.
112. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 632 (1987).
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justify the plan. 13 It explicitly declared Weber to be a case in
which the Court failed to concern itself with past discrimination by
the employer itself.114 The Court permitted the company to make a
comparison to the general work force, rather than asking for a comparison with the percentage of skilled craft workers in the area labor force. The Supreme Court in Johnson explained why:
Such an approach reflected a recognition that the proportion of black
craft workers in the local labor force was likely as minuscule as the
proportion in Kaiser's work force. The Court realized that the lack of
imbalance between these figures would mean that employers in precisely those sndustrzes sn whwh discrminationhas been most effective would be precluded from adopting
training programs to increase
115
the percentage of qualified minorities.

Therefore, the Supreme Court accepted the idea that the employer
should be allowed to address the problem of societal discrimination
for which no wrongdoer can be identified.
The Court did not retreat from this position in Johnson. The
Court allowed the employer to redress an inbalance in its work
force caused by "strongsoczal pressures" against female participation in traditionally all-male job categories. 1 16 While the Supreme

Court endorsed the principle of voluntary affirmative action to
tackle the problem of societal discrimnation, the Court severely cut
back the principle's application for the kind of jobs where societal
pressures accomplish their most efficient results.- "The Supreme
113. See zd. at 632-33 ("Application of the 'pnmafame'standard in Title VII
cases would be mconsistent with Weber's focus on statistical imbalance, and
could inappropriately create a significant disincentive for employers to adopt an
affirmative action plan").
114. See id. at 633 n.10.
115. Id. at 633 n.10 (emphasis added).
116. See zd. at 634 n.12. Although the Supreme Court, in Johnson, did not
directly address the issue of providing female workers with "role models," as an
attempt to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination, it surely did not reject
this idea. In its conclusion on the manifest imbalance prong, the Court determined that the employer was justified in taking sex into account as a factor in
the decision making process. In considering the appropriateness of taking sex
into account, the Court seemingly approved a role model theory as an additional
justification for the affirmative action plan. The Court stated:
In addition, the Agency was mindful of the importance of finally hiring a
women in a job category that had formerly been all-male. The Director
testified that, while the promotion of Joyce 'made a small dent, for sure, in
the numbers,' nonetheless 'philosophically' it made a larger impact in that
it probably has encouraged other females and minorities to look at the possibility of so-called 'non-traditional' jobs as areas where they and the
agency both have samples of a success story.
Id. at 637 n.14.
Under the equal protection analysis, Wygant stands for a rejection of the
role model theory as a sufficiently compelling reason to institute an affirmative
action plan in the employment context. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 275 (1986). But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997
(1990).
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Court Giveth," allowing the private employer to redress imbalances
caused by societal discrimination, "And The Supreme Court Taketh
Away," by requiring the employer to draw, for skilled positions, a
comparison that is unsympathetic to the fact that the number of
qualified minority or female applicants or employees is low due to
societal pressures and discrimination.
In light of the broad remedial purpose of Title VII to eliminate
the last vestiges of discrimination, an employer should be allowed
to institute an affirmative action plan whenever the composition of
its work force reflects a manifest imbalance compared to the composition of the general population or the area labor market. The
Supreme Court's rejection of this idea is based on the unwarranted
fear that a finding of a manifest imbalance based on a comparison
with the general population or the general labor market results in a
blind hiring by numbers regardless of the qualifications of the
minority or female applicants. 117 This fear is completely
unsubstantiated.
Affirmative action does not include hiring or promotion of unqualified minority or female workers.' 1 8 When the actual employment decision must be made according to the affirmative action
plan, only qualified applicants are considered.?' 9 The employer, in
order to fully address societal discrimination, should be allowed to
117. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 636 (1987). In Johnson, the Court stated:
By contrast, had the Plan simply calculated imbalances in all categories
according to the proportion of women in the area labor pool, and then directed that luring be governed solely by those figures, its validity fairly
could be called into question. This is because analysis of a more specialized
labor pool normally is necessary in determining underrepresentation in
some positions. If the plan failed to take distinctions in qualifications into
account m providing guidance for actual employment decisions, it would
zndicate mere blind hrng by numbers, for it would hold supervisors to
'achievement of a particular percentage of minority employment or membership
regardlessof circumstances such as economic conditions or the
number of qualified minority applicants!
Id. (emphasis added).
118. Buchanan, supra note 30, at 241-42.
119. Other ways of eliminating the problem of blind hiring by numbers of
unqualified applicants exist, while still allowing the employer to redress the
effects of societal discrimination in "skilled jobs." One could allow the employer to start up an affirmative action plan based on a manifest imbalance between the composition of its own labor force and the composition of the general
population or the area labor force. After establishing the manifest nnbalance,
one could require the employer to draft a second comparison: comparing the
percentage of qualified minority or women workers in its work force to the
percentage of qualified applicants in the relevant labor market. This is the
comparison the Supreme Court forces the employer to make in the first place,
as a justification for the institution of its affirmative action plan. See Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 631-33 (1987).
Based on this second comparison, the employer would then be allowed to hire a
percentage of minority or female applicants equal to the difference shown by
the second comparion. The employer would be allowed to do so even when the
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hire or promote qualified minority or women workers up to their
respective percentages in the area labor market. When qualified
applicants do not exist m sufficient numbers, the employer will not
hire or promote unqualified applicants, and it probably can not be
forced to do so.
From the economic point of view, the employer has absolutely
no incentive to hire incompetent or unqualified workers. Legally,
there is no way in which to bind the employer by the figures in its
voluntarily adopted affirmative action plan, if no qualified applicants are available. An affirmative action plan that constitutes part
of a consent decree remains under the continuing jurisdiction of the
approving court. Judicial sanctions enforce the provisions of the
consent decree. It remains unlikely, however, that a court will hold
an employer m contempt of court for not hiring the number of minority or female workers required by the affirmative action plan if
few qualified applicants exist. The court may withhold its assistance in enforcing the decree if it considers any part of the agreement or its enforcement inequitable.120 If the employer adopts the
affirmative action plan unilaterally, the employer's violation of the
plan fails to constitute a Title VII violation because no law requires
the employer to institute an affirmative action plan m the first
place.12 '
3. The Magnstude of the Manifest Imbalance
After explaining the nature of the required comparsons, the
Supreme Court in Johnson dealt with the problem of the magnitude of the imbalance necessary to establish its manifest nature or
second comparison only shows a difference of a substantially lesser degree than
the one that would make out a manifest imbalance.
A second way of redressing societal discrimination, can be found in an approach that is accepted by the courts to some degree. The finding of a manifest
imbalance between the employer's skilled labor force and the skilled area labor
market is, however, a prerequisite for following this approach. Once the existence of such a manifest unbalance is established, the employer would be allowed to engage in "accelerated affirmative action," hiring or promoting
qualified minority or female applicants at a higher percentage than the percentage of qualified applicants available. This approach certainly finds support in
Weber Although Weber did not deal with skilled jobs, but rather with a traming program to require the necessary skills for being hired as a craft worker, the
reasoning still holds. The area labor force was found to be only 39% black. The
affirmative action plan, nevertheless, reserved 50% of the positions in the trainmg program available to blacks. This clearly is a form of accelerated affirmative action approved by the Supreme Court. See United Steelworkers, AFLCIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197-200 (1979).
120. See Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties,87 MIcH.
L. REv. 321, 359 (1988).
121. See, e.g., Liao v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 867 F.2d 1366, 1368-69 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert dened, 110 S. Ct. 1806 (1990); Manoharan, M.D. v. Columbia
Umv. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1988); French v.
United States Trust Co., 47 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 1 38,382 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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conspicuousness. The Court stated, "A manifest imbalance need
not be such that it would support a prima facie case against the
employer..
1'22 The Court noted, however:
In some cases, of course, the manifest unbalance may be sufficiently
egregious to establish a prmnafacte case. However, as long as there is a
manifest unbalance, an employer may adopt a plan even where the disparity is not so striking, without being required to introduce the nonstatistical evidence of past discrimination that would be demanded by
the 'primafacie' standard. . Of course, when there is sufficient evidence to meet the more stringent 'prnmafacte' standard, be it statistical, non-statistical, or a combination3 of the two, the employer is free to
adopt an affirmative action plan.12

The establishment of a primafacze case requires a justification for
the employer willing to start up an affirmative action plan.
The question remains, however, how much less of an unbalance
124
justifies race or sex affirmative action efforts under Title VII.
Factually, both Weber'2 5 and Johnson126 were easy cases concerning the existence of a manifest imbalance. In both cases, the mainfest imbalance was grossly apparent. 12 7 Although the Supreme
Court denied that an imbalance needs to be sufficient to make out a
pr'mafacte case of discrimination, the Supreme Court failed to suggest an alternative standard.12s Employers are left with little guidance, not only because it remains uncertain what degree is
necessary to make an imbalance manifest, but also because the
Court never clearly described the minimum level of disparity that
would satisfy the prima facie standard in direct discrimination
cases in the first place.12 9
122. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.

616, 632 (1987).
123. Id. at 634 n.11 (emphasis added).
124. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 783.
125. Of the employer's craft workforce, 1.83% was black (5 out of 273), compared to 39% of the local labor force. It was not hard for the Court to find that
Kaiser's work force was indeed manifestly unbalanced. United Steelworkers,
AFL-CIO-CLC V Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99 (1979).
126. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 636 ("As the Agency Plan recognized, women
were egregiously underrepresented in the Skilled Craft job category, since none
of the 238 positions was occupied by a women").
Because of the complete absence of female presence in the skilled craft
work force, Justice O'Connor treated the case as an "inexorable zero" case m
which the statistical imbalance would have been sufficient for a prma facie
Title VII case brought by unsuccessful women applicants. Id. at 656-57
(O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Rutherglen & Oritz, supra note 14, at 48081. For a discussion of "inexorable zero," see International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977).
127. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 782-83.
128. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 654 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. The Supreme Court in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, stressed
that the Court had never "suggested that any particular number of 'standard
deviations' can determine whether a plaintiff has made out a prnma facte case
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The imbalances shown in the cases upholding the affirmative
action plans illustrate blatant situations and would probably satisfy
a prmafacte case of discrimination. 130
The required showing of manifest unbalance is also related to
another part of the Courts' analysis of the validity and legality of
affirmative action plans. If the established imbalance fails to rise to
the level of "manifest," the affirmative action plan runs counter to
one of the other requirements unposed both by Weber13 1 and Johnson,1 32 namely that the affirmative action plan must be desgned to
eliminate a conspicuous or manifest unbalance and not just to
maintain an already roughly balanced work force. 3
4. The Employer's Burden of Proof
The comparison the Supreme Court requires an employer to
draw when it designs an affirmative action plan for skilled positions
transported some of the difficult problems encountered m the field
of direct employment discrimination law into the field of voluntary
affirmative action. The distribution of the different burdens of
proof m reverse discrinination lawsuits challenging the validity of
affirmative plans under Title VII, as established in Johnson, should
prevent these difficulties from inhibiting voluntary affirmative action.134 To assess the validity of an affirmative action plan, courts
in the complex area of employment discrmnniation." Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988). The Court in Castanedav. Partida
previously noted, however, that "as a general rule," a statistical disparity of
more than two or three standard deviations may be considered as a gross disparity that allows the inference of discrimination. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 497 n.17 (1977). See also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 309 n.14 (1977).
130. See, e.g., United States v. City of Miam, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1339 (5th
Cir. 1988) (imbalances of 46.9% to 11% and 44% to 7%); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356 (9th Cir. 1987) (30% to 11.4% and 17% to 7.3%), cert denzed,489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Shidaker v. Tisch, 833 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1986) (21.1%
to 5%), cerL denzed, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't Of
Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1131 (2d Cir. 1983) (standard deviation of
5.86), cert dented, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614
F.2d 1358, 1364-65 n.14 (5th Cir. 1980) (27.3% to 8.3%, 8.5% and 2.1%; 37% to
11.6%, 2.6% 1.1% and 0%); Detroit Police Officer's Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671,
688 (6th Cir. 1979) (17.23% to 11%), cert. dented, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Tangren v.
Wackenhut Servs., 480 F Supp. 539, 546-47 (D. Nev. 1979) (16% and 14% to 5%),
aff'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert densed, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
131. See United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC V Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09
(1979).
132. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 654.
133. For an application of this principle, see Jurgens v. Thomas, 29 BNA
FEP Cas. 1561,1583-84 (N.D. Tex. 1982). See aso Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73,
78 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert dented, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988).
134. For a discussion of the importance of the distribution of the burden of
proof, see Gould, supra note 50, at 1496 ("In most Title VII litigation, the critical
question centers on which party carries the burden. The same is true whether
the burden is one of production or persuasion").

The John Marshall Law Remew

[Vol. 24:731

must address a number of difficult factual questions. These questions involve the relevant qualifications for the jobs at issue in the
affirmative action plan and the geographical boundaries of the relevant labor market, the composition of which has to be compared to
the composition of the employer's own labor force.
The first question determines the kind of comparison that the
Court requires the employer to make: Do the job categories for
which the employer wants to start up an affimative action plan involve any special skills or qualifications? For jobs that require no
special expertise, a comparison with the general population' 35 or
area labor statistics is appropriate. 136 Based on the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Hazelwood, on which the Johnson Court heavily relied, the same comparison will suffice for jobs that require
37
skills "that many persons possess or can fairly readily acquire."'
When jobs do requre some special expertise, but the expertise is
normally acquired through on-the-job training, the same principle
holds.138 If the employment requires preexisting skills for satisfactory job performance, the Supreme Court demands the employer
make a comparison to "those in the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications."' 1 9 In practice it is difficult to determine
135. The Supreme Court, in Johnson,considered both the comparison to the
general population, and the comparison to the area labor force to be appropriate
when the affirmative action plan only deals with unskilled jobs. Johnson,480
U.S. at 632 (1987). The Supreme Court's position is probably based on the assumption that the ethnic and sexual composition of the general population is
reflected in the composition of the labor market. When substantial deviations
exist, however, the comparison to the area labor force might be more appropriate. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 778 n.57; Note, Manifest Imbalance, supra
note 76, at 2013.
136. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 632 (1987).
137. See Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13
(1977) (the job of truck driver falls within this category) (citing International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1976)).
138. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632 ("a comparison
with the percentage in
the area labor market or general population is appropriate in analyzing
training programs designed to provide expertise").
The comparison to the general population or area labor market is only appropriate for training programs that do not require any preexisting expertise
for satisfactory participation in the training program. For example, an insurance company with a large computer department needs computer programmers. It normally provides its newly hired employees with a two month
training program. Due to the specific needs of the company, a training program
is of bare necessity, as none of the computer science graduates has ever dealt
with the specific programs he or she is facing in the company. If the employer
wants to institute an affirmative action plan for its computer department, comparison of its work force with the general population statistics will be considered inappropriate. Although the affirmative action plan involves a training
program, special expertise is required for participation in it. See also Edwards,
supra note 5, at 781-82.
139. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632.
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whether a job qualifies as a skilled or an unskilled job.1 40 An additional problem exists for jobs requnng special skills. It is not always easy to find those in the general labor market who possess the
required qualifications. 141
The Supreme Court, in Johnson, determined that the relevant
comparison is with the arealabor force. The Court failed, however,
to specify how to construe the "area" concept. The use of different
geographical areas for comparison with the employer's work force
leads to different outcomes concerning the existence or absence of a
manifest imbalance. This is true when the employer is located in or
near neighborhoods with high concentrat1ons of mmorities. 142
Courts have considered different geographical areas to be the rele140. Although some courts do not explicitly decide on the nature of the job,
their position can be inferred from the comparisons that were used. For examples of what different courts consider to be skilled or unskilled jobs, see Wards
Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 647 n.3 (1989) (skilled positions:
noncannery jobs in salmon cannery factory, such as machinist, engineer, quality
control personnel, cook, carpenter, store-keeper, bookkeeper, beach gangs for
dock yard labor and construction; unskilled position: cannery job on the cannery line); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977)
(non-skilled position: truck driver, skilled position: school teacher); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977) (position
of truck driver requires comparison to .general population); Cygnar v. City of
Clncago, 865 F.2d 827, 839. (7th Cir. 1989) (a position n the Office of Municipal
Investigation requires the comparison to narrowly focus on those actually qualified), cert. den-ed, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Janowiak v. Corporate City of South
Bend, 836 F.2d 1034,1039-40 (7th Cir. 1987) (position of city fireman requires the
focus of the comparison to be narrowed to those actually qualified), cert dented,
489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (position
of entry-level fire fighter requires comparison to area labor force), cert denied,
486 U.S. 1036 (1988); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356 (9th Cir. 1987)
(the position of fire fighter/engmeer requires comparison to city population in
general), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Mann v. City of Albany, 687 F Supp.
583, 588 (M.D. Ga. 1988) (the position of assistant chief of police requires comparison with working age population). See also Note, Manifest Imbalance,
supra note 76, at 2009-12.
141. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 779. Edwards gives the following example
of an assistant manager in a supermarket:
[lit is unclear how one should determine the number of minorities or women in a relevant labor market who 'possess the relevant qualifications' to
The range of possible qualifibe an assistant manager of a supermarket.
cations for this type of job is so broad that any effort to quantify the
number of minorities or women who possess them may be little more than
an exercise in futility.
Id.
Edwards suggests that in such a case, the area labor market may serve as a
proxy for the qualified area labor market, save proof to the contrary. See ?d. at
779-80. See also Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95
HARV. L. REV. 945, 984-85 (1982).
142. The geographical boundaries of the relevant area labor market are of
less relevance when the affirmative action plan is instituted to the benefit of
female workers only. Communities or neighborhoods with n extremely high
or low concentration of women will be rare.
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vant labor market. 143 Absent any compelling counter mdication,'4
a court should consider the area from which the employer normally
hires as the appropriate labor market for the comparison. 14 5
A white male employee challenging the validity of an affirmative action plan bears the ultimate burden of establishngsts tnvalidity.14 The Supreme Court in Johnson held that the analytical
framework used in disparate treatment cases (allocating burdens of
proof and production) are readily applicable to lawsuits questioning
the vadility of an affirmative action plan. The Court thus applied
147
the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.
The plantiff must first establish a primafacie case that the employer took race or sex into account in making its employment decision. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a primafaciecase, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulatea nondiscmminatoryrationalefor its decision. "The existence of an affirmative action plan
provides such a rationale. If such a plan is articulated as the basis
for the employer's decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
prove that the employer's justification is pretextual and the plan is
143. See, e.g., Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied,486
U.S. 1036 (1988). In Hammon, the court stated,
There should be no mistaking the correct benchmark in this case: the relevant labor force consists of persons 20 to 28 years of age in the Washington
metropolitanarea,not just within the confines of the Nation's capital. The
reason is that it is undisputed that approximately half of the District's entry-level fire-fighters have hailed from the suburbs.
Hammon, 826 F.2d at 77-78 (emphasis in original).
See also Mann v. City of Albany, 687 F. Supp. 583, 588 (M.D. Ga. 1988) (comparison to standard metropolitan area); Drayton v. City of St. Petersburg, 477 F
Supp. 846, 857 n.20 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (the relevant labor market must be determined on the basis of historical facts and peculiar contemporary conditions, if
any, in the labor market itself).
144. The area from which the employer ordinarily recruits may not be the
relevant area labor market when it appears that the employer, in the past, directed its hiring efforts to areas such as predominantly white neighborhoods. If
this employer feels "remorse" and decides to institute an affirmative action
plan, it should not be prevented from doing so merely because the composition
of the area from which it "normally" recruited, as compared to the composition
of its work force, does not show the required manifest imbalance to justify an
affirmative action plan. The relevant labor market area should therefore be the
area from which the employer could reasonably be expected to recruit, absent a
discrimnatory practice. In redressing its former discriminatory practices and
choosing the relevant area labor market from which to make its comparisons,
the employer should be given a wide latitude.
145. See Note, Manifest Imbalance,supra note 76, at 2015-16; Spencer, When
PreferentialHirngBecomes Reverse Discrimination,14 EMPLOYEE EL. L.J.
513, 516 (1989).
146. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 626 (1987). The same is true for the constitutional analysis. See, e.g.,
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 467 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) (burden remains
with employees to demonstrate unconstitutionality of affirmative action
program).
147. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
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invalid."148
The second step in the analytical framework requires the employer only to articulatea nondiscrimnatory rationale for its employment decision. 149 The reliance on the affirmative action plan is,
thus, not an affirmative defense that requires the employer to carry
the burden of proving the plan's validity. The ultimate burden of
persuasion remains with the plaintiff.150 The employer's burden of
proof is a mere burden of production, not of persuasion.' 5' As a
practical matter, the employer will "produce" more than just the
fact that the challenged employment decision was made pursuant to
an affirmative action plan.' 52 The employer will also attempt to
avoid the charge of pretext (the third step in the McDonnell Douglas anaylitical framework) by presenting evidence m support of its
148. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626.
149. Id. See also Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 1989);
Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1987),
cerL dented, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 355

(9th Cir.1987), cert dented, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989).
150. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627. According to the McDonnell Douglas -

Burdine analytical framework, the burden resting on the plaintiff is a burden of
proof by preponderance of evidence. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Because the Supreme Court adopted this analytical framework for reverse discrimination lawsuits, the same standard should
govern in affirmative action lawsuits.
151. In Burdine, the Court statech
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of discrimnation by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected,
or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated
. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence
by the proffered reasons
raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against plaintiff
If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption
raised by the prima facie case is rebutted.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 (emphasis added).
152. The employer must produce evidence that its employment decision was
made pursuant to the affirmative action plan it instituted. The mere existence
of an affirmative action plan, however, is not a sufficient articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. The employer must still produce some evidence that the challenged decision was taken according to the plan. The
employer's obligation to produce evidence that its particular employment decision was made pursuant to an affirmative action plan "forces" the employer, at
the same time, to produce evidence of the existence of an actual plan. Informal
and ad hoc affirmative action decision making, in the absence of a plan, does not
satisfy this requirement. See Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 849 (7th
Cir. 1989); Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va., 797 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1986);
Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys., 651 F.2d 520, 527-28 (7th Cir. 1981); Sester v.
Novack Inv.Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1146 (8th Cir. 1981), cert dented, 454 U.S. 1064
(1981); Wilmington Firefighters v. City of Wilmington, 632 F Supp. 1177, 119091 n.14 (D. Del. 1986); Dougherty v. Barry, 607 F Supp. 1271, 1287 (D.C.D.C.
1985), vacated %npart, 869 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Harmon v. San Diego
County, 477 F Supp. 1084,1089 (S.D. Cal. 1979), qff'd in part, rev'd in part,664
F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Vaughn, supra note 3, at 561-62; Kreiling &
Mercurio, supra note 14, at 71-76.
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53

Both the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework for establishing an employer's Title VII violation when instituting an affirmative action plan, and the imposition of the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the plaintiff challenging the validity of the plan, suggest that the employer retains a large degree of discretion when
evaluating the need for instituting an affirmative action plan. The
employer's analysis of the composition of its own work force, of the
relevant labor market, and of the comparison between the two,
should be presumed valid until the plaintiff proves the contrary by
carrying the ultimate burden of persuasion. The manifest imbalance proffered by the employer should enjoy a defacto presumption
14
If the employer decides to compare the composition
of validity.M
of the job catergories for which it wants to institute an affirmative
action plan to the general labor market, the relevant positions
should be considered unskilled positions. If a plaintiff challenges
the veracity of the employer's determination of the nature of the
jobs involved, the plaintiff should introduce convincing evidence
that the employer made the wrong determination. 55 The same applies for the employer's geographical delineation of the relevant labor market from which it generally hires employees. Absent
convincing evidence to the contrary, a court should not reject an
153. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 626-27 (1987).
154. The reasoning of a federal district court that "once a perpetrator, untrustworthy for the rest of your life," is faulty and is inapplicable when dealing
with an employer instituting an affirmative action plan because of a manifest
imbalance without the existence of any prior discrimmatory employment practices. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F Supp. 979, 1010 (E.D.
Mich. 1987), rev'd, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979).
155. This approach was followed by the District of Columbia Circuit in Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 F.2d
400 (1988). The affirmative action plan at issue dealt with higher-level positions
in the police department. The employer found a manifest unbalance between
the composition of these positions and the composition of the area labor market
in general. The Court approved the comparison.
The appellants vaguely suggest in their brief that there appears to be no
manifest racial imbalance if the number of blacks in the Department's
higher-level positions are compared with those blacks in the labor force
who possess the qualifications for those positions. However, even assuming
that this were the appropriate statistical data against which the Departthe appellants failed at trial to introduce
ment's Plan should be judged
any data that purports to identify those m the District of Columbia labor
force who possess the requisite qualifications. Because the ultimate burden
the appellant's unsupof proof in a Title VII case is on the plaintiff
ported contention must fail.
Id. at 1304-05.
See also zd. at 1306 n.22; Edwards, supra note 5, at 780-81; Note, Manifest
Imbalance,supra note 76, at 2017-18. But see Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d
827, 840 (7th Cir. 1989); Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 836 F.2d
1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Hammon v. Barry,
826 F.2d 73, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988).
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employer's reasonable justification for the institution of its affirmative action plan.156 At all times, the ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact remains with the plaintiff, the white male challenging the validity of the affirmative action plan in a reverse discrimi15 7
nation lawsuit.
The imposition of a mere burden of production on the employer is consistent with the approach followed m direct employment discrimination cases. The burden is also consistent with the
Court's emphasis on voluntary action as the preferred means to
achieve the ultimate goal of Title VII, which is to eradicate the last
vestiges of employment discrimination. Imposing a high burden of
proof on the employer, such as a burden of persuading the court of
the ultimate statutory validity of an affirmative action plan, discourages the voluntary institution of affirmative action efforts. The
imposition of only a burden of production is also consistent with the
Supreme Court's recognition of Title VII's wide managerial prerogatives. Generally, the employer maintains full managerial freedom

under Title VII, except for specific exceptions. Similarly, a court
should accept the employer's justification for an affirmative action
plan unless effectively rebutted. Absent contrary evidence intro-

duced by the plaintiff, courts should accept the reasonable justification proffered by the employer...
.

Burden Prong

The second prong of the Supreme Court's analysis concentrates
on the consequences of the affirmative action plan for those who
are not its beneficiaries.. In a world of limited resources, a benefit to
one person inevitably leads to a detriment to another.158 "It is mev156. The plaintiff must come forward with convincing evidence that the employers' justification (nondiscriminatory reason) for the affirmative action plan
is pretextual or did not motivate the particular disputed decision. Judge Edwards noted correctly that this should not be an easy burden to overcome:
For one thing it simply is counter-intuitive to think that an employer would
purposely rely on maccurate statistics to defend an affirmative action plan.
Generally, employers adopt affirmative action plans with great reluctance,
and are not searching for mischievous ways to justify them. And given the
highly visible nature of affirmative action plans, an employer who relies on
bogus data would simply be inviting lawsuits.
Edwards, supra note 5, at 781.
157. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253

(1981).
158. See Germann v. Kipp, -429 F Supp. 1323, 1335 (W.D. Mo. 1977), vacated,
572 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1978). Some commentators argue that the burden of
instituting an affirmative action plan should not be carried by the innocent
white male employees, and that certain forms of affirmative action efforts
should thus only be executed through granting benefits from an increased
amount of resources: "enlarging the pie to be divided." See, e.g., Burke &
Chase, Resolvng the Senzrity/Minority Layoffs Conflict" An EmployerTargeted Approach, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81-116 (1978).
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itable that nonminority employees or applicants will be less well off
under an affirmative action plan than without it, no matter what
form it takes."' 59 Understandably, they will be unhappy, but it is
"unlikely that all involved will be completely happy with any result.'

1 60

White male employees were "innocent beneficiaries" of

past illegal discriminatory practices. Some white male employees
will now become "innocent victims" who must share some of the
burden that accompames redressing past wrongs. 161 At what point
will this burden be considered an "unnecessarily trammeling of
their rights"?
This burden prong of the analysis is directed toward two questions. The first, and most important, question is whether the affirmative action plan leaves sufficient competitive room for the
white male majority; or, stated differently, whether the plan creates an absolute bar to the white males' participation in the distribution of "employment goods" (hiring, promoting, protection
against layoffs). The second question deals directly with the affirmative action plan's possible intrusion upon the rights of the white
males. 162
1.

Constitutionaland Title VII Burden Analysss Compared

The burden prong of the analysis of the validity of an affirmative action plan under Title VII generally equates to the second
prong of the constitutional analysis. 6 3 However, in both Johnson
and Weber, the Supreme Court declined to use the language of the
constitutional "strict scrutiny" analysis. The Supreme Court failed
to mention the narrowly tailored requirement of the constitutional
analysis. Instead, the Court held that an affirmative action plan
would not be valid under Title VII if it unnecessarily trammeled
the interests of the white male majority. Should "unnecessarily
trammeling" be equated with "narrowly tailored"?
The preferential layoff provisions of the collective bargaining
159. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 754, 791 n.31 (1989).
160. See United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1342 (5th Cir.
1980).
161. See Martin,490 U.S. at 791. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 280-81 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutzmck, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980); Bratton
v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 891 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. City of
Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322,1342 (5th Cir. 1980); Van Aken v. Young, 541 F Supp.
448, 455 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 750 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1984).
162. The other conditions the Supreme Court discusses under its burden
analysis are more directly related to the nature of the affirmative action plan
itself than to the actual burden imposed on the non-beneficiares of the plan.
They are therefore appropriately dealt with under a separate inquiry. See znfra
"II. C. Remedial Nature Prong."
163. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 777; Note, DisparityIn Standards,supra
note 76, at 410 n.62; Buckely, supra note 14, at 722.
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agreement in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education'64 were not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive equal protection scrutiny.
The Supreme Court advanced two reasons supporting this conclusion. First, the burden mposed by the affirmative action effort on
nonminority employees was too intrusive. Second, "less zntruszve
means of accomplishing szmilar purposes" were available.'6
Under its Title VII analysis, the Supreme Court never requires an
employer instituting an affirmative action plan to show that no less
1 66
restrictive alternatives are available to reach its purpose.
The Supreme Court failed to explain why it uses the term
(un)necessary trammeling in the context of voluntary affirmative
action. When dealing with the Congressional powers under the
constitutional "necessary and proper clause,"'167 the Supreme Court
interpreted the meaning of the term "necessary". The Court concluded that the term necessary should not always be understood as
meaning indispensable. The requirement that means must be necessary to reach an end does not exclude all choice of means. Means
that are necessary to reach an end might include means that are
164. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
165. Id. at 283-84.

While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of
several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial
equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of
their lives. That burden is too zntruszve. We therefore hold that, as a
means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be legitimate, the
Board's layoff plan is not sufficzently narrowly tailored. Other,less intrusive means of accomplishingsimilarpurposes - such as the adoption of
hiring goals - are available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of
layoffs as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose, cannot satisfy the
demands of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. (emphasis added).
166. But see Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
It is clear from Wygant and Johnson that several factors are relevant in
determining whether a plan 'unnecessarily trammels' any legitimate interests of nonnimority or male employees. Conceptually, there appears to be
no reason why these factors should differ depending on whether the plan is
analyzed under Title VII or the Constitution; if some affirmative action is
warranted, but the chosen remedy is unnecessarily burdensome, a less intrusve remedy would be required under both the statute and the Constitution. And in fact, our examination of Wygant and Johnson suggests that
the Supreme Court's analysis under the second prong of the test does not
vary in these contexts.
Id. at 1303 (emphasis added).
See also Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("because available race-neutral alternatives were not considered
the race-based hiring
methods were not properly tailored to its remedial purposes"), cert denied, 486
U.S. 1036 (1988). The Supreme Court in Wygant never reached the Title VII
question. The Trial Court had dismissed the Title VII claim for lack of jurisdiction. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F Supp. 1195, 1203 (E.D. Mich.
1982), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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essential, useful or convenient to reach that end, and thus also
means that are reasonably related to it.168
The means an employer uses to voluntarily reach the ultimate
purpose of Title VII, which is the elimination of all forms of employment discrimination, should be considered m conformity with
the requirements umposed by Title VII if they are reasonably related to Title VII's goal.1 69 An affirmative action plan aimed at

reaching real equality of employment opportunities for all should
not be confined to the least restrictive alternative available. Imposing the "least restrictive alternative" requirement on the employer
willing to institute an affirmative action plan runs against the
Supreme Court's emphasis on voluntary action as the preferred
means to promote the goal of Title VII. 170 Leaving the employer
only with the alternatives of either instituting the least restrictive
affirmative action plan possible, or refusing to institute any plan at
all, also runs contrary to the Supreme Court's recognition of managerial prerogatives m the area of voluntary affirmative action under
Title VII.171 A reasonable choice of means in the pursuit of a set
goal is inherent in the concept of managerial prerogatives.172
168. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), where the
Court stated.
Congress is not empowered by it [the necessary and proper clause] to
make all laws, which may have relation to the powers conferred on government, but such only as may be 'necessary and proper' for carrying them
into execution. The word 'necessary,' is considered as controlling the whole
sentence, and as limiting the right to pass laws for the execution of the
granted powers, to such as are indispensable, and without winch the power
would be nugatory. That excludes the choice of means, and leaves to Congress, in each case, that only which is most direct and simple.
Is it true, that is the sense in wich the word 'necessary' is always
used? Does it always import an absolute physical necessity, so strong, that
one thing, to which another may be termed necessary, cannot exist without
that other? We think it does not. If reference be had to its use, the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it frequently
imports no more than that one thing is convenient,or useful, or essential to
another To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally understood
as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being
confined to those szngle means without whwh the end is entirely
unattainable.
Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court followed the same reasoning when deciding whether
governmental restrictions upon commercial speech are invalid if they go beyond
the least restrictive means to acneve the desired end. See Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
169. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 22-23; Kreiling & Mercurio, supra note 14, at
65-69. See also Sester v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968 (8th Cir. 1981).
170. See United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203-04
(1979).
171. See id. at 206.
172. See, e.g., Sester, 657 F.2d at 970.
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While the Supreme Court introduced a "categorical" distinction in its equal protection analysis between affirmative action
plans dealing with hiring and promotions on the one hand, and layoffs on the other, no similar distinction is warranted under Title
VII. Although the Supreme Court considers it important for an
equal protection challenge to distinguish between different affirmative action plans based on the stage of the employment relationship
which the plan implicates, no sound legal basis exists to defend this
distinction in the context of the statutory validity of affirmative action plans.173
2.

Absolute Bar

Both

in

Weber and Johnson, the Supreme Court stressed that

the plans at issue failed to create an absolute bar to the advancement of the white male employees. The affirmative action plan approved in Weber made sure that "half of those trained in the

program [would] be white."174 The plan instituted by the Transportation Agency in Johnson did not set aside any positions for women.
"The Plan merely [authorized] that consideration be given to affirmative action concerns when evaluating qualified applicants."'175
Women had to compete with all other qualified applicants. "No
persons [were] automatically excluded from consideration; all
[were] able to have their qualifications weighed against those of
other applicants."'176 Although the Supreme Court speaks in terms
of an absolute bar, 177 it is not unlikely that something less than the
173. See mnfra "II. B. 3. Rights of White Males at Different Stages of the
Employment Relationship."
174. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
175. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 638 (1987).
176. Id.
177. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640; Local 28 of Sheet Metal Worker's Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479 (1986); United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). See also Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denzed, 111 S. Ct. 248 (1990);
Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. dened, 486 U.S. 1036
(1988); Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1534 (l1th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 480 U.S.
149 (1987); Bushey v. New York Civil Serv. Comm'n, 733 F.2d 220, 228 (2d Cir.
1984), cert dened, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985); La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 127980 (9th Cir. 1982); Sester v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 969 (8th Cir. 1981);
Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 652 F.2d 1012,1016 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hunter v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry., 639 F.2d 424,426 (8th Cir. 1981); Sester v. Novack Inv.
Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1143-44 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981);
United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1366 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. City of Miann, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1340 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
City & County of San Francisco, 696 F Supp. 1287, 1310 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modified, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989), cert demed, 111 S. Ct. 248 (1990); Smith v.
Harvey, 648 F Supp. 1103,1113 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Jones v. Memphis Laght, Gas &
Water Div., 642 F. Supp. 644, 662 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 626
F Supp. 30, 34 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Breshard v. Directors Guild, 34 BNA FEP Cas.
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total exclusion of the white male majority might be considered an
absolute bar.178 How much less than a 100% preference to minority
and female applicants will be considered as an absolute bar to white
male advancement?
The Supreme Court supported the idea that reaching a balanced work force remains a valid goal for an affirmative action
plan. Several methods may accomplish this goal: sex and race can
be "just a factor" to consider, the plan can use quotas or percentage
goals, or it may set aside a specific number of slots for minority or
female applicants. 179
When an affirmative action plan takes race or sex into account
as one of the factors on which to base the actual employment decision, it does not automatically exclude anyone from consideration
and everyone competes for the open slots. Affirmative action plans
of this nature do not create an absolute bar to the advancement of
white male employees. Instead, they represent a "flexible case-bycase approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women" in the employer's work force and
remain "fully consistent with Title VII."' is Affirmative action
plans of this nature embody "the contribution that voluntary employer action can make m eliminating the last vestiges of discrnmi1045,1047,1049 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Kirkland v. The New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 552 F Supp. 667, 677 (S.D. N.Y. 1982); Van Aken v. Young, 541
F Supp. 448, 458 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Cohen v. Community College, 484 F Supp.
411, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Harmon v. San Diego County, 477 F Supp. 1084, 1090
(S.D. Cal. 1979). See also Kreiling & Mercuno, supra note 14, at 65; Vaughn,
supra note 3, at 563.
178. See, eg., Kirkland v. The New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.,
711 F.2d 1117, 1134 (2d Cir. 1983) ("non-minorities on the list will not be unduly
barred from promotion") (emphasis added).
179. The distinction between "set asides," quotas and percentages, is not very
clear. When quotas or percentage goals are used, no specific number of positions is set aside. When an affirmative action plan establishes a 20% hiring goal,
one fifth of the future openings will go to qualified minorities or women. The
number of positions actually obtained by women or minorities is uncertain. The
Supreme Court, in Johnson, speaks of "program[s] actually set[ting] aside positions according to specific numbers." Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa
Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 640 (1987). The reference to "specific numbers" and the fact that the Supreme Court cited Local Number 93, Intl Assoc. of
Fireighters v. City of Cleveland (providing among other things for a set
number of minority promotions), might indicate that set asides differ from the
use of quotas or percentages. See %d.(citing Local Number 93, Int'l Assoc. of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986)). The emphasis seems to
be on the positions actually filled with minority or female applicants. A plan
that sets aside 10 promotions for blacks, would then guarantee that the first ten
upcoming promotions would go to black applicants. The term "set aside" will
therefore refer to an actual number of positions reserved to minorities or
women.
180. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 642 (1987).
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nation in the work place."1 8 ' All white male applicants have a
chance to compete and to have their qualifications weighed against
those of the beneficiaries of the plan. Sex and race are not the sole
factors which determine the actual employment decision. L8 2
The Supreme Court is reluctant to accept affirmative action
plans that use racial or sexual "quotas" as opposed to plans that set
a goal and then take race or sex into account only as a factor in its
decision making process. Lss The Court considers a quota a goal
"thatmust be met" 184 regardless of the availability of qualified nnnority or female applicants. L8 5 Opposition toward the use of quotas
originated in the Court's fear that affirmative action might lead to
86
the hnng and promoting of unqualified minorities or women.'
181. I. See also Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert
dented,486 U.S. 1036 (1988); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 357 (9th Cir.
1987), cert dented, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); United States v. City & County of San
Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 1287, 1310 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modified, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th
Cir. 1989).
182. That is at least the way in which affirmative action plans of this kind
are theoretically supposed to work. In practice, there is not much difference
between considering race and sex merely as a factor, on the one hand, and setting aside a specific number of slots or "quota goals," on the other.
The Supreme Court, in Johnson, noted that Mr. Johnson, who was passed
over by Ms. Joyce, was finally promoted a few years later to a newly created
position as road dispatcher. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638 n.15. When Johnson
was denied the promotion in 1979 or 1980, he had no guarantee that he would be
promoted in the future. The only guarantee Johnson had was that he was not
totally barred from consideration. The fact that an affirmative action plan
takes sex only into account as a factor, however, does not mean that the affirmative action plan will in practice not work in the same way as a plan setting
aside a specific number of positions. The Transportation Agency had a clear
number of female promotions in mind, even when its plan provided that sex
was only to be taken into account as a factor. Id. at 636-37. Is it that unreasonable to think that the Agency would have preferred a female applicant over
Johnson every time a promotional position became available and a sufficiently
equally qualified women applied for it? Is that assumption really unreasonable,
at least until the moment the Agency had made the specific number of female
promotions it had in mind?
183. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638-39.
184. See ud. at 638. The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1991 would define the
term quota as "a fixed number or percentage of persons of a particular race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin which must be attained, or which cannot
be exceeded, regardless of whether such persons meet necessary qualifications
to perform the job." H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 111(b) (1991).
185. See Bridgeport Firebird Soc'y v. City of Bridgeport, 686 F Supp. 53, 61
n.9 (D. Conn. 1988) ('To label the selection procedure for the nineteen additional Lieutenants as a 'strict racial quota' is a misnomer. Although the race of
a candidate is a criterion for promotion, it is not the sole criterion").
186. For a discussion regarding the fear that using quota may result in hinng
or promoting unqualified applicants, see Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729
F.2d 1554, 1563 (5th Cir. 1984); Boyd, supra note 14, at 19-20. In Williams, the
Court stated:
Of critical inportance is the recognition that the court may properly take
into account the possibility that a fixed quota may well deny the application
of a standard requrimg qualification for the positions. While the proposed
consent decree states that no unqualified person need be hired or pro-
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However, affirmative action does not involve hiring and promoting
unqualified applicants. Employers who establish quotas or percentage goals in affirmative action plans attempt to achieve those goals
without resorting to hiring or promoting unqualified people.1 8 7 If a
sufficient number of potential beneficiaries of the voluntary plan
does not exist, the quotas and goals will not be met and the employer can not be forced to reach its present goals by filling slots
with unqualified applicants. 18s In addition, the employer has absolutely no incentive to do so. The actual employment decisions made
pursuant to this kind of affirmative action plan are not based on
race and sex alone. Therefore, to receive preferential treatment,
minority and female applicants must satisfy the employer's requirements for satisfactory job performance. Only after the applicants
satisfy those mmnmum conditions do race and sex become determining factors in filling the slots the affirmative action plan reserved for its beneficiaries.
In a sense, this was the situation when the Agency promoted
Ms. Joyce over Mr. Johnson. The employer regarded both as sufficiently, if not equally, qualified, 8 9 but it preferred Joyce over Johnson. Although the Agency did not base its decision on sex alone,
sex eventually became the determining factor for the actual decision.19° Therefore, in practice, the method in which the employer
makes the an actual employment decision does not differ consideramoted, there can be a proper concern that a fixed 50% requirement m promotion could place undue pressure upon qualification requirements.
Williams, 729 F.2d at 1563.
187. The employer determines the qualifications necessary for successful job
performance. Some of the applicants will possess more than the required mummum qualifications. The use of quotas and goals might lead the employer to
hire or promote a female or minority applicant possessing the minimum required qualifications over a white male who is"overqualified." In this situation,
the employer did not hire an unqualified applicant. Moreover, it is highly questionable that "being overqualified" isa quality in itself. One should also bear m
mind here, the Supreme Court's observation in Johnson that "it is a standard
tenet of personnel administration that there is rarely a single, 'best qualified'
person for a job." Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal.,
480 U.S. 616, 641 n.17 (1987). See also W GOULD, supra note 6, at 112; Belton,
supra note 30, at 129-33.
188. See Spiegelman, Court-OrderedHiring Quotas After Stotts: A Narrative on the Role of the Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment
DiscrzmznationDoctrine, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 n.1 (1985). Although
Spiegelman addresses court-ordered quotas, the article notes that the use of
quotas should not be equated with hiring unqualified applicants.
189. Johnson,480 U.S. at 641 n.17. The Court noted that, "Any differences in
qualifications between Johnson and Joyce were minimal, to say the least. The
selection of Joyce thus belies the dissent's contention that the beneficiaries of
the affirmative action program will be those employees who are merely not 'utterly unqualified."'
190. If Joyce had been a man, it islikely that Joyce would not have been
preferred over Johnson. Johnson had scored better on the first interview although only slightly better.
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bly under either type of affirmative action plan. The difference is
of a quantitative or numerical nature. The affirmative action plan
m Johnson "guaranteed" a case-by-case approach. An affirmative
action plan working with racial or sexual quotas involves a more
aggregated approach. The employer first considers the qualifications of the applicants and then determines more generally the
number of cases - with the affirmative action plan as guidance in which sex or race will be the factor tipping the balance m favor
of minority or female applicants.
Any difference in legal treatment between an affirmative action plan such as the Johnson plan, and an affirmative action plan
establishing a quota can not be justified by the difference in their
nature alone.191 An affirmative action plan using quotas can not be
invalidated based solely on that reason.192 The affirmative action
plan the Supreme Court approved in Weber established a 50%
quota for blacks. 19 3 The Court upheld the plan because the plan did
not create an absolute bar to the advancement of white applicants.
White applicants still qualified for half of the open positions.' 94
The use of quotas or percentage goals is not per se impermssible.
However, the validity of an affirmative action plan using quotas remains questionable when the employer sets the percentage goal at a
level that may create an absolute bar to the advancement of white
male employees. Thus, the more appropriate question is at what
level does a percentage goal become an impernnssible bar for the
advancement of the non-beneficiaries of the affirmative action
plan?
191. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 21. See also Marsh v. Board Of Educ., 581 F
Supp. 614, 627 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Note, Raczal Quota, supranote 14, at 248 n.18.
The absence of a clear conceptual distinction between goals and quotas is well
illustrated in United States v. City of Miam%, Fla, where the court stated, "We
refuse to engage in any semantic dispute over the difference between 'goals'
and 'targets' on the one hand and 'quotas' on the other. We will gladly adopt
any word proposed, as long as the thrust of affirmative action is not stayed."
United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1335 n.26 (5th Cir. 1980)
(emphasis added).
192. See, ag., City of Miami, 614 F.2d at 1335 ("It cannot seriously be argued
that there is any insurmountable barrier to the use of quotas to eradicate the
effects of past discrimination").
193. See Allegretti, supra note 14, at 773-97; Boyd, supra note 14, at 19-21;
Buchanan, supra note 30, at 236 n.48; Cox, supra note 44, at 793; Gould, supra
note 14, at 649; Kreiling & Mercurio, supra note 14, at 65; Sape, Use of Quotas
after Weber, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 239,240 (1980); Vaughn, supra note 3, at 563;
The Supreme Cour4 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 252 (1979). See also Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Mikva, J., dissenting), cert. denzed, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988); Williams v. City Of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1560
(5th Cir. 1984); Cohen v. Community College, 484 F Supp. 411, 434 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
194. See United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979).
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An affirmative action plan can legitimately pursue the attainment of a balanced work force. A percentage goal corresponding to
the minority and female representation m the relevant labor market should be considered reasonable and valid under Title VII.
Moreover, this level of female and minority participation corresponds to the level one would ordinarily expect if society was not
195
tainted by discriminatory practices.
However, some employers recognize that practical difficulties,
such as the availability of a sufficient number of qualified minority
or female applicants and the possibility of a low turn-over rate in
the employer's work force, prevents the employer from reaching its
goal soon after instituting the plan.'6 Therefore, some affirmative
action plans include, apart from the ultimate goal of reaching a proportional work force, lower interim goals winch are more realistic
197
aspirations.
Other plans, such as those which include the establishment of
new training programs without requiring any prerequisite qualifications for admittance, will not encounter the same practical
problems. The ultimate goal is to reach a work force with a composition that mirrors the composition of the relevant labor market.
To reach this goal in the near future, the plans provide for the hirmg of minority and female applicants at a higher percentage rate
than their percentage in the local labor market. 9 8 These plans provide for "accelerated affirmative action." Their purpose is to
achieve a balanced work force as soon as possible and then return to
sex- and race-neutral employment practices.
Setting an affirmative action plan's interim goals at a lower
level than the ultimate goal of proportional representation can not
negatively affect the plan's statutory validity. Because the achievement of a balanced work force is a valid goal to pursue, and because
the overall concern in the second prong remains directed towards
the burden placed upon non-beneficiaries of the plan, lower interim
goals will not create additional hurdles for the approval of an af195. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340
n.20 (1977).
196. See, e.g, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal.,
480 U.S. 616, 622 (1987).
197. See United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Fifth Circuit noted,
The ultimate goal [of the plan] is to obtain percentages of blacks, Spanishsurnamed individuals, and women generally consistent with their percentage in the community. The interim level goals appear to be set below those
levels, presumably reflecting the parties' belief that for the immediate future there may be an inadequate supply of qualified minority and female
applicants.
Id. at 1339.
198. See, e.g., United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
198-99 (1979).
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firmative action plan.199 The affirmative action plan in Johnson
presents a perfect example. The plan's long-term goal was to attain
a work force whose composition-reflected the proportion of minorities and women in the area labor force. In addition, the plan pro2 0°
vided for lower, short-range, goals requiring annual adjustments.
In upholding the promotional decision made pursuant to the affirmative action plan, the Supreme Court emphasized that the plan represented a "flexible, case-by-case approach to effecting a gradual
improvement in the representation of minorities and women in the
20
Agency's work force." '
Interim goals can also reflect the employer's willingness to
undo the effects of past societal discrimination at a faster, rather

than slower, pace. The employer may decide to hire, promote or
train minority and/or female applicants or employees at a higher

20 2
rate than that suggested by their proportion in the labor force.
203
The affirmative action plan then serves as a catch-up remedy.
In
Weber, the Supreme Court approved an affirmative action plan that
set an interim goal of 50% minority participation in a training program seeking to reach an ultimate goal of a 39% minority craft
work force.20 4 Commentators argue that there is no justification
for this kind of accelerated affirmative action because "it becomes

impossible to identify any limiting-principle." 20 5 Allowing an employer to establish interim goals exceeding the ultimate goal of its
affirmative action plan, however, is an advantage because the duration of the affirmative action plan is reduced. 2 °6 An affirmative ac199. The fact that a plan with lower interim goals will likely work less efficiently mnredressing the effects of societal discrimination can not be challenged
by minority and female applicants. Title VII does not require an employer to
institute an affirmative action plan, in the absence of any discriminatory practices on its behalf. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). Therefore, the employer that
institutes a plan can not be forced through Title VII to make sure that its plan
will be efficient and fast. Efficiency of a voluntary affirmative action plan is not
a condition for its statutory validity.
200. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 622.
201. Id. at 642.
202. See, e.g., United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir.
1980) (27% of population was black, interm goal of hi-mg 50% blacks).
203. See Allegretti, supra note 14, at 794 n.128; Boyd, supra note 14, at 23
n.174; Meltzer, supra note 3, at 462.
204. See United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99
(1979).
205. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 252 (1979).
206. Allegretti illustrates that working with lugher interim goals will significantly speed up progress toward a proportional representation of minority and
female employees or applicants with a mathematical example. Allegretti,
supra note 14, at 793-94. Allegretti argues that limiting interim goals to the
ultimate goal of the affirmative action plan "will require the affirmative action
plan to continue for a lengthy, perhaps indefinite, period of time." Id. at 794.
See also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1986). Paradisedealt with
a court-ordered affirmative action effort. The district court had ordered the
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tion plan of a more limited duration also tends to institutionalize
the consideration of race and sex to a lesser degree 20 7 because it
operates for a shorter period of time.
The extent to which accelerated affirmative action should be
allowed can not be determined in general. However, a 100% interm goal works as an absolute bar, even if instituted only for a
limited period of time. Therefore, a total exclusion of white male
applicants and employees from consideration is illegal 2 08 In considering how high the interim goal may be set, an employer should
consider that the Supreme Court spoke in terms of an absolute bar,
not just a significant bar.209 Employers should give further consideration to the level of their ultimate goal, 210 the composition of the
Alabama Department of Public Safety to promote 50% of blacks until 25% of
the rank or corporal was composed of blacks. Only 25% of the relevant labor
pool was black. Id. The Government suggested that the one-for-one promotion
requirement was arbitrary "because it bears no relationship to the 25% minority labor pool relevant here." Id. Justice Brennan, in announcing the opinion of
the Court, answered this contention:
This argument ignores that the 50% figure zs not itself the goal; rather it
represents the speed at which the goal of 25% will be achieved. The interim
requirement of one-for-one promotion (had it continued) would simply
have determined how quickly the Department progressed towards this ultimate goal.
Id. at 179-80 (emphasis added).
The accelerated 50% figure was considered to represent the speed and not
the goals to reach. Justice O'Conner, in dissent, criticized the stand taken by
Justice Brennan, because this kind of justification "has no stopping point; even
a 100% quota could be defended on the ground that it merely 'determined how
quickly the Department progressed towards' some ultimate goal." Id. at 199
(O'Conner, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, however, justified the accelerated
effort by referring to "the department's failure after almost twelve years to
eradicate the continuing effect of its own discrimination and to develop acceptable promotion procedures and in light of the severity of the existing racial nnbalances." Id. at 181 (quoting the District Court). The accelerated affirmative
action effort can thus be seen as reasonable under the circumstances of the case.
The speed with which the end goals is reached is not on itself a sufficient justification for accelerated action.
207. See Davison, Preferential Treatment and Equal Opportunity,55 OR. L.
REV. 53, 80 (1976).
208. See, e.g., Sester v. Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1144 (8th Cir. 1981),
cert. dented, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981); Cohen v. Community College, 484 F Supp. 411
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
209. See Vaughn, supra note 3, at 563. But see Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 638 n.15 (1987) ("While this
degree of employment expansion by an employer is by no way essential to a
plan's validity, it underscores the fact the Plan in this case in no way significantly restricts employment prospects of such persons"). In the text of the decision itself, the Court refers to the fact that the plan at issue did not create an
absolute bar. Id. at 637-38.
210. A 50% interim goal may be excessive with regard to an ultimate goal of
15%, but not with regard to one of 40%.
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relevant labor market,2 1 1 and the degree of imbalance the employer's current work force represents.2 1 2 Additional considerations include the size, organization, turnover rate and nature of the
employment,2 1 3 the degree of interference with vested rights and
legitimate expectations of the white male employees regarding certain positions and benefits, and also the fact that the positions involved in the affirmative action plan may be newly created. 214 The
accelerated interim goal the employer wants to adopt has to be reasonable underall czrcumstances. The interim goal should be a reaeliminating a manifest
sonable attempt to reach the ultimate goal of
21 5
imbalance in the employer's work force.
In Johnson,the Supreme Court stressed that the ultimate burden of proving the invalidity of an affirmative action plan rests on
the plaintiff challenging it.2 16 The employer only carries a burden

of production in a reverse discrimination lawsuit. This article argued above that the analysis established in Johnson provides the
employer with a de facto presumption in favor of the validity of its
plan. This presumption should not only apply for the justification
prong of the analysis of the validity of the plan. When the em211. When the area in which the employer normally recruits has a very high
concentration of minority inhabitants, the employer should be allowed to set
the ultimate goal, as well as the interim goal, at a hikher level.
212. In the case of an "inexorable zero," for instance, interim goals of a
higher level should be justified. In Weber, 50% of the positions in the training
program were reserved to minority applicants. The minorities represented only
39% of the local general population. The training program, however, was only a
means to provide minorities with the necessary skills to become craft workers.
The 50% goal was an interim goal for the ultimate goal of reaching a proportional craft work force. The almost complete absence (1.83%) of minority craft
workers serves as a justification for the accelerated interim goal. See United
Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
213. See Davidson, supra note 207, at 81 ("In positions requirmng extensive
training and with slow turnover, it may be necessary to extend the preference
in time and require hiring a greater proportion of the preferred group").
214. The interim goal in Weber concerned slots in a training program that
was introduced by the employer to tram minority employees in order to enable
them to work as skilled workers. The training program was new. No white
employee had any vested right or legitimate expectation of participating in it.
See Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99. See also Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Kilberg & Tallent, supra note 14,
at 374; Schatzki, supra note 46, at 73 n.56 (1980).
215. Allegretti sees an interim goal of 50% as the presumptive upper limit.
'There is the intuitive psychological sense that a 50/50 breakdown of positions
is reasonable and fair." Allegretti, supra note 14, at 795. Only compelling reasons would allow an employer to transcend this upper limit. Id.
The standard that the accelerated interim goal must be reasonable under
all circumstances does not only allow the employer to set its interim goals at a
higher level than 50%, when justified, but has the supplementary advantage of
requiring the employer to establish lower interim targets according to the context in winch it is operating.

216. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Country, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 626 (1987).
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ployer uses accelerated interim goals to eliminate a manifest mbalance in its work force, the burden should rest with the plaintiff to
prove that these interim goals are not reasonable under all circum217
stances and that they create an absolute bar to his advancement.
The plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of persuasion.
A third method21 8 for eliminating a manifest imbalance in an
employer's work force is settingaside a specific number of positions
for minority and/or female applicants. Based on a prediction of the
future fluctuation of its work force and on a study of the composition of its current work force, the employer may decide to reserve a
specific number of the presumed amount of positions to minorities
or women.
An affirmative action plan using set asides does not necessarily
create an absolute bar to the advancement of the white male majority. The following example will demonstrate this point. An employer makes reasonably certain predictions about potential
opeings in its work force. The employer determines that during
the next year its work force will grow from 100 employees to 150.
The 50 new employees will be engaged in purely manual labor. No
special skills are required. The composition of the employer's work
force shows an "inexorable zero" as far as female representation is
concerned. The employer decides to institute an affirmative action
plan for women and decides to reserve 30 of the 50 new positions for
female applicants. Is there any reason why the employer's affirmative action plan should be invalidated? Is it the fact that the employer explicitly reserved a number of positions instead of
expressing its affirmative action goals in percentages or quotas?
Certainly not. Setting aside a number of positions to be filled with
217. See United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Fifth Circuit dealt with an affirmative action plan establishing accelerated
interim goals for blacks. The court stated:
The extent and velocity of affirmative action is among the most difficult
problems facing the judiciary today. Even the Supreme Court has been unable or unwilling to lay down any guidelines concerning the speed with
which voluntary affirmative action may proceed. District courts should not
have unchallengeable power to slow its pace.
Id. at 1362. The court went on to state:
For a successful performance on a tightrope, the rope must be sufficiently
taut to support the acrobat, yet must have enough play to afford him some
control. An affirmative action plan has similar constraints. The extent of
an acceptable plan can not be measured with mathematical exactitude.
The plan must not strangle employees of any race or sex, but with too
much play, the leeway for employment decisions based on racial or sexual
prejudices becomes too large. Goals and targets, set at reasonable levels,
can afford this degree of flexibility.
Id. at 1366 (emphasis added).
218. The first method consisted of taking race or sex into account as afactor
in the employment decision making process. The second method consisted of
establishing quotas or percentagegoals.
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minority or female applicants should not necessarily lead to the invalidation of the affirmative action plan.2 1 9 This method of implementing an affirmative action plan resembles a method using
quotas or percentages of goals 2 °0
219. The affirmative action plan contained in the consent decree in Local
Number 93, required the Cleveland fire department to reserve a certain number
of the total proposed promotions for minority applicants who were not themselves actual victims of discrimination. The federal district court's approval of
the consent decree was upheld by the Supreme Court. Local Number 93, Int'l
Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO-CLC v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
The Supreme Court in Johnson considered the challenged promotional decision an affirmative action effort in which sex was only a factor in the decision
making process. Interestingly, the Agency's affirmative action plan was, to a
certain degree, working with set asides. The Court noted that "the Agency's
1982 Plan set a goal of hiring only three women out of the 55 new Skilled Craft
Positions projected for that year, a figure of about 6%." Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 638 n.15 (1987).
Thus, the type of affirmative action method used is not decisive regarding
the statutory validity of the affirmative action plan. The numerical level of the
quotas used or the set asides in the affirmative action plan will be determining.
See, eg., Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 248 (1990). In Dams, the Ninth Circuit stated.
The Umon argues that advancement of noininorities has been absolutely
barred because the decree provides for the mandatory promotion of minorities and precludes competition by nonminorities for the slots set aside for
minorities. We disagree.
The mandatory promotion of thirty-three minorities was balanced by
the optional promotion of forty-eight additional firefighters, 75% of whom
were nonmnorities. The Supreme Court in Weber held a voluntary affirmative action plan reserving 50% of job openings for Black workers to remedy past discrimination did not create an absolute bar to the advancement
of nonmmority employees because they could compete for the remaining
In the present case, only 25% of the forty eight
50% of job openings.
optional openings were reserved for minorities. In addition, preferential
selection for promotions of minorities in the future will be based on the
percentage of minorities in the relevant labor force - the fire department
- allowing nonmmorities to continue to compete for a large number of
remaining positions.

Id. at 1448-49.
220. The second method is not really different in nature from the first
method described, namely the use of race or sex as only one factor taken into
account in making the actual employment decisions. See Regents of the Umv.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 378 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Brennan stated:
Finally, the Davis' special admissions program cannot be saul to iolate the
Constitution simply because it has set astde a predetermined number of
placesfor qualifiedminority applicantsratherthan using minority status
as a positivefactor to be consideredin evaluating the applicationsof disadvantaged minority applicants. For purposes of constitutional adjudication,
there is no difference between the two approaches. In any admissions program which accords special consideration to disadvantaged racial mmoties, a determination of the degree of preference to be given is unavoidable,
and any given preference that results in the exclusion of a white candidate
is no more or less constitutionally acceptable than a program such as that at
Davis. Furthermore, the extent of the preference inevitably depends on
how many minority applicants the particular school is seeking to admit in
any particular year so long as the number of qualified minority applicants
exceeds that number. There is no sensible, and certaznly no constitutional,
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The same reasoning that applies to affirmative actions plans
containing percentage goals should, therefore, apply here. One
should consider if the number of slots reserved to the beneficiaries
is reasonable under all circumstances. To determine whether the
number of slots set aside is reasonable under all circumstances, the
same factors should be taken into account, such as: the composition
of the employer's labor force and the employer's current degree of
imbalance; the size, organizational structure and turnover rate of
the company; the degree of interference with the vested rights and
legitimate expectations of the white male majority; the time lapse
in which the employer sees itself able to realize its plan;221 and all
other factors that might be relevant to the particular circumstances
under which the affirmative action plan is introduced.
White males are not absolutely barred from participating in an
affirmative action plan such as the one in this example. The fact
the employer's predictions might not be completely accurate is no
reason to invalidate the plan. Reasonableness under all circumstances is the standard to determine whether the set asides create
an absolute bar to the advancement of the white male majority. If
the number of positions reserved to the beneficiaries of the affirmative action plan is too high given the circumstances under which the
plan is introduced, the plan might be invalidated as foreclosing all
advancement of the non-beneficiares. However, plans using set
asides should not automatically be invalidated.
3. Rights of White Males at Different Stages of the Employment
Relationship
Weber mentioned that one criteria that made the plan fall at
the permissible side of the demarcation line between permissible
and impermissible affirmative action plans, was that "the plan did
not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white male employees." 222 Johnson redefined this part of the analysis to consist of an
inquiry into the question of whether the affirmative action plan did
unnecessarily trammel the rghts of the non-beneficiaries. 223 The
distinction between, for example, adding a set number of points to the admisson rating of disadvantagedmnority applicantsas an expression of
preference with the expectation that this will result in the admission of an
approximately determined number of qualified minority applicants and setting a ftixed number of places for such applicants as was done here.
Id.
221. The expected amount of time necessary to implement the plan is important here, but not as an independent requirement. It is one of the factors taken
into account to determine whether the employer's affirmative action effort is
reasonable under all circumstances.
222. United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
223. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Country, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 637-38 (1987).

1991]

Voluntary Affirmative Action

Court determined that, in the absence of an absolute entitlement to
the positions in an affirmative action plan, a plan can not unsettle
any legitimate firmly rooted expectations. 224 ,
This part of the analysis of the statutory validity of affirmative
action plans requires an assessment of the rights and absolute entitlements of the white male majority at the different stages of the
employment relationship that might be implicated by an affirmative action plan.
a.

Hiring

Affirmative action plans instituting hiring preferences for female or minority applicants are generally upheld by lower courts if
they satisfy the other requirements for statutory validity. 22s To be
upheld, none of the applicants for the open positions can possess a
vested right or an absolute entitlement to be hired.226 Neither the
qualified white male, nor the qualified minority or female applicant
can have legitimate firmly rooted expectations about obtaining a po2 27
sition with the employer instituting an affirmative action plan.
These factors are especially true when the affirmative action plan
deals with positions such as the newly created training program in
228
Weber.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (Title VII's prohibition in §§ 703(a) and
(d) against racial discrimination does not condemn all private, voluntary, raceconscious affirmative action); La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir.
1982) (upholding a California Highway Patrol affirmative action program
designed to employ women as traffic officers); Hunter v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 639 F.2d 424, 426 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding a railway's affirmative
action plan to hire black engineers); United States v. City of Alexandria 614
F.2d 1358, 1366 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding consent decree proposal containing
hnrmg and promotional goals); United States v. City of Miani, Fla., 614 F.2d
1322, 1339-40 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding consent decree designed to obtain percentages of black, Spanish-surnamed, and female employees); Van Aken v.
Young, 541 F Supp. 448, 459 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (upholding voluntary affirmative
hiring practices of city), aff'd, 750 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1984).
See also Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va., 797 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1986)"
(invalidating the affirmative action hiring goals because of the absence of safeguards - such as express or implied goals or timetables - protecting the interests of the majority applicants). But see Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (invalidating hiring preferences because the affirmative action plan at
issue did not consider raceneutral alternatives), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1036
(1988); Harmon v. San Diego County, 477 F Supp. 1084, 1090-91 (S.D. Cal. 1979)
(invalidating hrmg practices based on consent decree), aff'd zn part, rev'd in
part,664 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1981).
226. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 770; Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 5, at
39.
227. The term affirmative action does not include hiring or promoting unqualified applicants or employees. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying
text.
228. See Schatzlk, supra note 46, at 73 n.56. Schatzki argues that the affirmative action plan in Weber did not only not work to the disadvantage of Brian
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Promotion

Similar to the fact that there is no right to be hired for an open
position, even when one is qualified for the position, there is no
right to be promoted.22 9 The private employer has a statutory obligation to refrain from discriminating on the basis of ethnicity or
sex, but the employer remains free to ground its employment decisions on any factor not declared inpermissible by Title VII. No
statutory obligation exists for an employer to promote an employee
who completes a testing process, designed to spot qualified employees for promotions, with the highest score.2so The fact that one employee is ranked higher than another employee applying for the
same promotion might increase one's personal expectations towards
the promotion, but it does not create a right or absolute entitlement
to the promotion. 231 Personal expectations are, as such, not sanctioned by law.
The Supreme Court, in Johnson,recognized that even the highest ranking applicant for a promotion normally does not have "an
Weber, but even worked to his advantage. Weber did not possess the skills for
working as a craftsman. The affirmative action plan and its training program
created a new opportunity for Weber to obtain the necessary skills. Even when
he did not get in the first year of its institution, he might apply again for participation and following years and be successful. Id. See also La Riviere v. EEOC,
682 F.2d 1275 (1982). See also Edwards, supra note 5, at 769 n.20; Kilbert &
Tallent, supranote 14, at 374.
229. The applicant for a position or a promotion has a right not to be rejected
or refused promotion because of his/her race, color, sex or national origin, according to § 703(a) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). As such, the right
not to be discrmnnated against does not create a right to the position involved.
See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117,
1128, 1134 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denzed, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 625 F Supp. 30, 34 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 804 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1986), cert
denzed, 480 U.S. 935 (1987); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671,
696 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. dented, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F Supp. 919, 927 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. den2ed, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
230. See Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law %nLabor Relations:
Three Dimensons of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675, 688 (1974)
("We should remember that in any case, the best 'qualified' never had any legal
right to employment. The law simply recognized an employer's discretion to
hire and promote at will").
231. No right to promotion exists unless, of course, the employer contractually bound itself to promote the employee with the highest score. Under these
circumstances, the employee might have a contractual claim. The same may be
true when promotions are granted on the sole basis of the seniority provisions
of, for example, a collective bargaining agreement. However, collective bargaining agreements establishing promotional procedures based solely on seniority are extremely rare. See Stacy, Title VII Sentority Remedies zn a Time of
Economw Downtown, 28 VAND. L. REV. 487, 490 (1975) ("A thorough recent
study of some 1,851 major collective bargaining agreements found promotionon-semority-only clauses in only three percent of the agreements having seniority provisions").
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absolute entitlement" to the position at issue. 232 The employer's interviewing panel recommended Mr. Johnson as the candidate to be
promoted. However, the panel also classified six other applicants
for the position as qualified and eligible. Because the Agency Director was authorized to promote any of the seven qualified applicants,
Johnson had no absolute entitlement to the position at issue. Because Johnson had no absolute entitlement to the position, the
Supreme Court considered that the denial of a promotion did not
unsettle any legitimatefirmly rooted expectations.233 The fact that
Mr. Johnson might have had personal expectations for a promotion
did not make the burden imposed on him by the promotion of the
female applicant too intrusive, in the absence of any absolute
2 34
entitlement.
Absolute entitlements to a promotion are rare, if not completely non-existent. Employers tend to keep a large degree of discretion in selecting the applicant to be promoted among all those
considered to be (minimally) qualified for the position. 2- The employee's personal expectations toward a promotion do not control,
both because of the employer's discretion concerning the final decision, and also because of the fact that "there is rarely a single, best
qualified person for a job.' 236
Because of the absence of any vested right to a promotion for
the white male employees, courts rightfully tend to uphold promo232. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480

U.S. 616, 638 (1987).
233. Id.
234. See also Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1302 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("expectations of nonnimority candidates do not become legitimate
merely upon assertion"), vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (1988); Higgins v. City of Vallejo,
823 F.2d 351, 357 (9th Cir. 1987) ("each had some hope of promotion, but none
had a legitimate expectation"), cert dented, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Bridgeport
Firebird Soc. v. City of Bridgeport, 686 F Supp. 53,58 (D. Conn. 1988) (involving
a mere expectation of promotion which did not rise to the level of a legally
protected interest).
235. For a discussion of an employer's discretion concerning promotion procedures, see Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-38; Higgins, 823 F.2d at 357; Kirkland v.
New'York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1128 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. den-ed, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
236. Johnson,480 U.S. at 641 n.17. Justice Brennan, in delivering the opinion
of the court, cited from the Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Society for
Personnel Administration:
It is a standard tenet of personnel administration that there is rarely a single, 'best qualified' personfor a job. An effective personnel system will
bring before the selection official several fully-qualified candidates who
each may possess different attributes which recommend them for selection.
Especially where the job is an unexceptional, middle-level craft position,
without the need for unique work experience or educational attainment
and for wich several well qualified candidates are availablefinal determinations as to which candidate is 'best qualified' are at best subjective.
Id. (citing Brief for the American Society for Personnel Administration as Amicus Curiae at 9, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal.,

The John Marshall Law Retnew

[Vol. 24:731

tional affirmative action plans, if the other conditions for their validity are satisfied.237 It should also be stressed here that
affirmative action plans dealing with promotions are (inherently)
more likely not to create an absolute bar to the advancement of the
white male majority, because white males who are denied a promo480 U.S. 616 (1987)) (emphasis added). See also Blumrosen, supra note 230, at
686-88.
The fact that the minority or female employee, finally promoted over the
white male employee and is sufficiently qualified for satisfactorily performing
the job at issue, is often mentioned among the factors ensuring that the affirmative action plan does satisfy the second prong of its statutory analysis. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639-42; Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 357 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. dented, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878,
892 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1366 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. City of Mian, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1340 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 696 F Supp. 1287, 130910 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modifted, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Harvey, 648
F Supp. 1103,1113 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Jones v. Memphis Laght, Gas & Water Div.,
642 F Supp. 644,662-63 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F Supp.
930, 986 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert dented, 464
U.S. 1040 (1984).
Some courts also recognize that "small differences between the scores of
the candidates indicate very little about the candidates' relative merit and fitness." See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d
1117, 1133 (2d Cir. 1983), cert dented, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). See also Paradise v.
Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1537 (11th Cir. 1985), qff'd sub. nom, United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Zalmen v. City of Cleveland, 686 F Supp. 631, 656
(N.D. Ohio 1988), off'd, 906 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1990); Bridgeport Firebird Soc'y v.
City of Brideport, 686 F Supp. 53, 57 (D. Conn. 1988); Kirkland v. New York
State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 552 F Supp. 667, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), ff'd,
711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983), cert dented, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); Germann v. Kipp,
429 F Supp. 1323, 1334 n.20 (W.D. Mo. 1977), vacated, 572 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir.
1978).
237. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal.,
480 U.S. 616, 638-40 (1987); Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d
1438,1448-49 (9th Cir. 1989), cert dented, 111 S. Ct. 248 (1990); Higgins v. City of
Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 357 (9th Cir. 1987), cert dented, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1133-34 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert dented, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d
878, 897 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1366
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1339-40 (5th
Cir. 1980); Mann v. City of Albany, 687 F Supp. 583, 587-88 (M.D. Ga. 1988);
Smith v. Harvey, 648 F Supp. 1103, 1114 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Jones v. Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div., 642 F Supp. 644,662 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); Youngblood v.
Dalzell, 625 F Supp. 30, 34 (S.D. Otno 1985), off'd, 804 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. dented, 480 U.S. 935 (1987); March v. Board Of Educ., 581 F Supp. 614, 626
(E.D. Mich. 1984); Baker v. Flint, 581 F Supp. 930, 985-86 (E.D. Mich. 1979);
Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F Supp. 919, 927 (E.D. Mich. 1979), qff'd, 704 F.2d
878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. dented, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
See also Paradise,767 F.2d at 1534; Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729
F.2d 1554, 1564 (5th Cir. 1984) (invalidating an affirmative action plan dealing
with promotional decisions mainly because of the use of a 50% quota and the
long duration - 12 years - of the plan involved). But see Bushey v. New York
State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 733 F.2d 220, 228 (2d Cir. 1984), cert dented, 469 U.S.
1117 (1985); Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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23 8
tion generally remain eligible for future promotions.

c.

Preferential Layoff Provisions
1)

Discharge and Replacement v. Layoffs

In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Supreme Court
struck down an affirmative action plan instituting preferential layoff provisions. 239 Wygant, however, did not address a Title VII
challenge. The Court considered the preferential layoff provisions
to be in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment Instead.240 The Supreme Court has never ruled on the
validity of a voluntary affirmative action plan instituting preferential layoff provisions for female and/or minority employees under
Title VII.241 Some commentators consider it not unlikely, however,
that the Court will extend its treatment of preferential layoff provisions under the equal protection clause to the Title VII analysis. 242
While the Wygant Court considered the burden imposed by
preferential layoff schemes too intrusive to survive an equal protection challenge, it declared that it had "previously expressed concern
over the burden.. .inposed on innocent parties." 2 3s The Court then
identified one of the characteristics of the affirmative action plan in
Weber that made this plan fall at the p~rmissible side of the "demarcation line": "the plan did not require the discharge of white
238. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 638 n.15 (1987). See also Higgzns, 823 F.2d at 357; Youngblood v. Dalzell, 625 F Supp. 30, 34 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 804 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1986), cert
denzed, 480 U.S. 935 (1987); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Servs., 552 F. Supp. 667, 672 (S.D. N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. dented, 465 U.S. 1005 (1989).
239. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
240. See zd. at 269-70. See also id. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part)
("There is no sue here of the interpretation and application of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; accordingly, we have only the constitutional issue to
resolve") (emphasis added).
241. The preferential layoff provisions dealt with in this section are provisions such as the one in Wygant. Article XII of the Collective Bargaining
agreement, covering layoffs, stated:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board (school board), teachers
with the most semority in the district shall be retained, except that at no
time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than
the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the
layoff.
Id. at 270-71.
242. See, e.g., Buchannan, supra note 30, at 262; Edwards, supra note 5, at
770-71; Gould, The BurgerCourt and Labor Law: The Beat Goes On - Marcato,
24 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 51,55 (1987); Rutherglen & Oritz, supra note 14, at 483-90;
Spencer, supra note 145, at 524.
243. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 (1986).
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workers and their replacement with new black birees." 2 "
An outright discharge of members of the white majority and a
replacement of them with minority or female applicants will potentially be a violation of the dictates of Title VII. 5 In Wygant, only
Justice White expressly noted that no distinction could be made between preferential layoff provisions and an affirmative action plan
that requires the discharge of white employees "to make room for
blacks, none of whom has been shown to be a victim of any racial
discrimination. . ."m Justice Powell announced the judgment of
the Court, joined by Justices Burger, Rehnquist and O'Conner, in
terms that considered the burden mposed by the layoff provisions
to be too intrusive, but expressed no opimon, on the equivalence
asserted by Justice White. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, clearly rebutted
the equation:
Justice White assumes that respondents' [the school board's] plan is
equivalent to one that deliberately seeks to change the racial composition of a staff by firing and hiring members of predetermined races...
That assumption ignores the fact that the Jackson plan involves only
the means for selecting the employees who will be chosen for layoffs
already necessitated by external economic conditions. This plan does
not seek to supplant whites with blacks, nor does it contribute in any
244. Id. See also United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
208 (1979).
245. See United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979); Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1534 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd sub. nom,
480 U.S. 149 (1987); La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1982);
Sester v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 969 (8th Cir. 1981); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 625 F Supp. 30, 34 (S.D. Ohio 1985), qff'd, 804 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denzed, 480 U.S. 935 (1987).
The fact that the functioning of the affirmative action plan did not require
the discharge of a white employee is very often taken into account to determine
the validity of the plan at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,
182 (1987); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 357 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denzed, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 897 (6th Cir.
1983); Bushey v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 733 F.2d 220, 228 (2d Cir.
1984), cert derned, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985); Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 652 F.2d
1012, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hunter v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 639 F.2d 424,
426 (8th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Harvey, 648 F Supp. 1103, 1113 (M.D. Fla. 1986);
Jones v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 642 F Supp. 644, 662 (W.D. Tenn.
1986); United States v. New Jersey, 614 F Supp. 387,391 (D.N.J. 1985); Kirkland
v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 552 F Supp. 667, 677 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), qff'd, 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. den-ed, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); Cohen v. Community College, 484 F Supp. 411, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
The same holds true for the absence of layoffs. See, e.g., United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 182 (1987); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc.
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479 (1986); United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 696 F Supp. 1287, 1304 n.38, 1310 (N.D. Cal. 1988), wdified, 890 F.2d 1438
(1989), cert dented, 111 S.Ct. 248 (1990); Jones v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div., 642 F Supp. 644, 662 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
246. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd.of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 295 (1986) (White, J.,
concurring). See also Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 5,at 41; Kreiling & Mercurio, supra note 14, at 102; Schatzki, supra note 46, at 72.
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way to the number of job losses. 247
Justice Marshall rightfully stressed that nobody lost his job due
to the affirmative action effort. Layoff provisions do not determine
the number of jobs lost. They only determine the rank order that
will be followed in case layoffs become "necessary" due to economic
circumstances. Preferential layoff provisions change the rank and
order to be followed. Race and/or sex will be taken into account
only as a factor to determine this order, along with the factors ordinarily taken into account. 24 8
The ultimate result of preferential layoff provisions may be
that some white males will lose their jobs, ii a way comparable to
the white males discharged and replaced by the beneficiaries of an
affirmative action plan. This similarity, however, should not have
any effect on the statutory validity of an affirmative action plan instituting preferential layoff schemes. First of all, as already mentioned, preferential layoff provisions themselves do not cause the
loss of any jobs. "Discharge and replacement" affirmative action
does cause the loss of jobs. Second, preferential layoff provisions do
not attempt to increase minority or female representation, but
those provisions merely attempt to preserve the gains of prior affirmative action. 249 Third, there is no reason to distinguish between
the different forms of affirmative action based solely on the stage of
the employment relationship they deal with. As previously suggested, "discharge and replacement" affirmative action will fail to
pass both constitutional and statutory muster. This is not because it
might result in the loss of jobs, but instead because sex or ethnicity
will become the one and only factor taken into account for discharging the white male employees, which thus creates an absolute
bar to their advancement. 250 As Justice Marshall mentioned in his
247. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 309 n.5 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 480 F Supp.
539, 549, (D. Nev. 1979), aff'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S.
916 (1982).
248. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 309 (1986) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens, also dissenting, stated the following.
Every layoff, like every refusal to a qualified applicant is a grave loss to the
affected individual. However, the undisputed facts in this case demonstrate
that this serious consequence to petitioners is not based on any lack of respect for their race, or on a blind habit and stereotype. Rather, petitioners
have been laid off for a combination of two reasons:the economic conditions that led Jackson to lay off some teachers, and the special contractual
protections intended to preserve the newly integrated character of the
faculty in the Jackson school.
Id. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
249. See d. at 309 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
250. The Supreme Court cited McDonald v. Santa Fe Trial Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976), when mentioning that the plan in Weber did not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of the white employees because the plan did not require
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dissent in Wygant, "layoffs are unfair, but unfairness ought not be
confused with constitutional injury."25' 1
Furthermore, Justice Stevens found Justice Powell's suggestion "that there is a distinction of constitutional significance under
the Equal Protection Clause between a racial preference at the tune
of hiring and an identical preference at the tine of discharge" completely unpersuasive. "The fact that the issue arises in a layoff context, rather than a hiring context, has no bearing on the equal
'252
protection question."
Title VII seems to bring forward the same principle. It is an
unlawful employment -practice for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,2

3

or to limit,

segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect a person's
status as an employee, because of the individual's race, color or
sex. 2- 4 The same holds true for training opportunities. 255 Discrmnnation by the employer on the basis of race or sex is prohibited at
all stages of the employment relationship. No distinctions are made
between hiring, training, employing or discharging2 6 employees or
the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees.
United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). The
fact that the Court cited McDonald might indicate that the Court really was
concerned with the situation where race (or sex) becomes the only factor on
which the employer bases the differentiation between employees. In McDonald, a black and some white employees were involved in misappropriating company property. The black employee was retained, while the white employees
were discharged. The only factor distinguishing the retained employee from
the discharged employees was the color of their skin. Race was the sole factor
that was taken into account for the differentiation of treatment. This was held
to be impermissible discrimination.
Fairly read, the complaint asserted that petitioners were discharged for
their alleged participation in misappropriation of cargo entrusted to Santa
Fe, but that a fellow employee, likewise implicated, was not so disciplined,
and that the reason for the discrepancy in discipline was that the favored
employee is negro while petitioners are white.
While Santa Fe may
decide that participation in a theft of cargo may render an employee unqualified for employment, this criterion must be 'applied, alike to members
of all races' and Title VII is violated if, as petitioners alleged, it was not.
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976). But see,
Schatzki, supra note 46, at 72.
251. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 296 (1986) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).

252. See id. at 319 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Schatzki, supra note
46, at 71; Selig, supra note 48, at 351-53.
253. Civil Rights Act § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
254. Civil Rights Act § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
255. Civil Rights Act § 703(d), 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2 (1982).
256. It is important to keep in mind that, in most jurisdictions, employment
at will is still the prevailing principle. Only limited inroads are accepted, such
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applicants.
Weber 2 57 and Johnson 258 both express the idea that, under the
appropriate circumstances, affirmative action does not run counter
to the Title VII dictates of non-discrimination. When an employer
aims an affirmative action plan at eliminating a manifest inbalance
in its work force, and the affirmative action plan does not create an
absolute bar to the participation of the white male majority and
does not unnecessarily trammel the rights or absolute entitlements
of its non-beneficiares, then the plan is in conformity with the prerequisites of Title VII. This is true regardless of the stage of the
employment relationslp implicated by the plan. Preferential layoff provisions must satisfy the same requirements as other affirmative action efforts to avoid a Title VII violation. The provisions may
not intend to maintain an already sufficiently balanced work force.
Once the employer's work force has shown a rough balance over a
certain period of time, preferential treatment (of any kind) of minority or female employees may run counter to this requirement.
Preferential layoff provisions included in an affirmative action plan
that is an ongoing effort to eliminate a conspicuous or manifest imbalance do not run counter to Title VII.2 9
To satisfy the requirements of Title VII, an affirmative action
plan must not create an absolute bar to the advancement of the
white male majority. Preferential layoff provisions that completely
prohibit the layoff of minority or female employees create such an
absolute bar and erect a categorical distinction based on race or
sex.2 60 To determine whether preferential layoff provisions create
an absolute bar, the same principles should be applied as for any
other form of affirmative action. As argued above, an affirmative
as a prohibition of discharge in violation of public policy, retaliatory discharges,
the operation of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Collective
bargaining provisions also may contain a clause in which the employer accepts a
restriction on its managerial prerogative to fire at will. Only when the employee can establish that the employer's right to discharge is limited and that he
thus has a "right" to his job, can an additional legal argument be found to reject
"discharge and replacement" affirmative action. This type of affirmative action
is rejected because, under these circumstances, the affirmative action plan will
unsettle legitimate fairly rooted expectations based on an absolute entitlement.
257. United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
258. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616 (1987).
259. See, e.g., Tangren v. Wackenhut, Servs., 480 F Supp. 539, 547 (D.. Nev.
1979), aff'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 456 U.S. 916 (1982). Preferential layoff provisions should not be invalidated merely because they cover a
reasonable period of time after reaching a rough balance m the employer's
work force. This period should be considered as being an integral part of the
"elimination effort."
260. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 310 (1986) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Contra Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 775
F.2d 794, 807 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. dented, 484 U.S. 925 (1987).
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action goal that corresponds to the minority or female representation in the relevant labor market is a valid aspiration for an affirmative action plan. Layoff provisions attempting to preserve female or
minority participation in the employer's work force which are part
of a plan with an ultimate, but unreached, goal of proportional representation do not create an absolute bar. Because the goal of proportional representation in the employer's work force is not yet
achieved, the percentage goal the preferential layoff provisions institute (such as the one at issue in Wygant) will naturally be lower
than the ultimate goal the Supreme Court is willing to accept,
of
namely the percentage goals that correspond to the percentage
261
minority or female applicants in the relevant labor market.
Finally, to pass muster, preferential layoff provisions must not
unnecessarily trammel the rights of the white male majority or unsettle legitimate, firmly rooted expectations based on absolute entitlement. This requirement leads to the question of whether the
institution of preferential layoff provisions implicates any right or
absolute entitlement of the white male employees,
2)

Seniority Rights

Increased participation of minorities and women in employment due to the institution of affirmative action plans is still a new
phenomenon. Therefore, women and minority employees tend to
have less seniority than their male counterparts and tend to occupy
jobs situated at lower levels of the company hierarchy. This makes
women and minorities particularly vulnerable in economic downturns. Layoffs are often conducted on the basis of seniority, according to the principle "last bired, first fired."2 2 In general, therefore,
layoffs have a disproportionate impact on those who were beneficiaries of prior affirmative action efforts. Layoffs might have the
effect of restoring the imbalance the affirmative action plan intended to remedy.2 63 The beneficiaries of an affirmative action plan
261. See, e.g., Tangren,480 F Supp. at 549 n.8.
262. See Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 5, at, 40-41; Hernandez, supra note
95, at 342; Kreiling & Mercurio, supra note 14, at 89; Levine, The Conflict Between Negotiated Senwrity Provmsons and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964: Recent Developments, 29 LAB. L.J. 352 (1968); Comment, Title VII And
SenoritySystems: Back to the Foot of the Line, 64 KY. L.J. 114 (1975) [heremafter Comment, Title VII and Seniority]; Comment, The Inevitable Interplay of
Title VII and the NationalLabor RelationsAct A New Role for the NLRB, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 158, 159 (1974) [hereinafter Comment, Inevitable Interplay];
Note, Last Hired,FirstFiredLayoffs and Title VII, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1544,1565
(1975) [hereinafter Note, Last Hired].
263. See Adams, Knslov & Lairson, Plantwzde Senzority, Black Employment, and Employer Affirmative Action, 26 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 686
(1972); Burke & Chase, supra note 158, at 82; Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 5,
at 45; Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: ConflictingModels of Racial Justice, 1984 SuP CT. REV. 1, 54; Hernandez, supra note 95, at 342-43; Kreiling &
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that established hlinmg goals, for example, can not rely on this plan
for continued employment. Voluntary affirmative action plans do
not by themselves "create a contract of permanent employment or
invalidate or modify a collective bargaining agreement providing
for layoffs on the basis of seniority."26
To avoid being laid off due to economic circumstances shortly
after being hired pursuant to an affirmative action plan, the beneficiaries could challenge the (existing) seniority-based layoff provisions as a violation of Title VII. Although it is clear that seniority
systems can be modified, female and minority employees will find it
hard to prevail in an action challenging the validity of an "unmodified" seniority system.265 Section 703(h) of Title VII protects an
employer from liability for applying different standards with regard
to terms, conditions, and privileges of employment when the differentiation is based on the functioning of a bona fide seniority system.266 The fact that a semority system tends to preserve the
effects of prior discrimination, be it societal discrmnnation or discrimination by the employer itself, does not establish a Title VII
violation.26 7 The disparate impact a seniority system might have on
Mercurio, supra note 14, at 89; Levine, supra note 262, at 352; Comment, Title
VII and Senzority, supra note 262, at 115; Comment, Inevitable Interplay,supra
note 262, at 159; Note Last Hired,supra note 262, at 1565.
For an example of the devastating effect of layoffs according to strict seniority on the gains of affirmative action, see Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 658
F.2d 705, 706 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982). See also Vulcan
Pioneers, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 588 F Supp. 732 (D.N.J. 1984),
ffl'd, 770 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1985).
264. N.A.A.C.P Detroit Branch v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 821 F.2d 328,
331 (6th Cir. 1987).
265. See Gould, supra note 50, at 1511.
266. § 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system
which measures earning by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided thatsuch differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminatebecause of race, color, religzon,
sex or nationalorgin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (emphasis added).
267. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 35354 (1977). See also California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S.598, 600 (1980);
Burke & Chase, supra note 158, at 88; Hernandez, supra note 95, at 351-53.
An additional difficulty for challenging seniority systems is created by the
Supreme Court's position taken in United Azrlines, Inc. v. Evans and affirmed
in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., where the Court refused to apply the
continuing violation theory to facially neutral seniority systems. See Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 912 (1989); United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977). A facially neutral system, even when adopted with
an unlawful discriminatory motive, can therefore only be challenged within the
prescribed period after its adoption. Lorance, supra, at 912. See also Gould,
supra note 50, at 1512-13.
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women or minorities is not considered sufficient to remove the seniority system from the category of bona fide seniority systems protected by the act. 268 To establish the "mala fide" character of a
seniority system, a plaintiff must prove that the system had its genesis in a discriminatory intent. This requires proof of the fact that
the system was bargained for or maintained with the intent to
269
discriminate.
Section 703(h) of Title VII grants extensive protection to seniority rights of employees, once an employer grants these rights.
Neither an affirmative action plan establishing hiring goals, nor a
Title VII challenge of an existing seniority system, will ordinarily
be adequate "devices" to prevent layoffs from undoing the gains of
prior affirmative action. A change of the existing semority-based
layoff schemes by establishing preferential layoff provisions for women and minorities seems to be the only way to maintain the already achieved progress of the ongoing affirmative action effort. To
verify whether an affirmative action plan passes statutory muster,
an employer must determine whether the plan unsettles firmly
rooted, legitimate expectations of white male employees by encroaching on absolute entitlements. Therefore, an employer must
determine whether the white male's seniority rights are really absolute rights or entitlements. This raises the question of whether
268. In InternationalBhd. of Teamsters v. Unzted States, the Court stated,
Where, because of the employer's prior intentional discrimination, the line
drivers with the longest tenure are without exception white, the advantages of the seniority system flow disproportionately to them and away
from Negro and Spamsh-surnamed employees.
This disproportionate
distribution of advantages does in a very real sense 'operate to "freeze" the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.' But both the literal terms of § 703(h) and the legislative history of Title VII demonstrate
that Congress considered this very effect of many seniority systems and
extended a measure of immunity to them.
431 U.S. 324, 349-50 (1977).
269. Id. at 356. In order for the employer to be shielded from liability under
Title VII, the system with the disparate impact on minorities and/or women, on
which the employer is relying, must be a seniority system. Id. The Supreme
Court has held that § 703(h) not only protects those components of a seniority
scheme "that embody or effectuate the principle that the length of employment
will be rewarded," but also protects ancillary rules that accomplish certain necessary functions in the seniority scheme. California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant,
444 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1980). The Court further acknowledged that "significant
freedom must be afforded employers and unions to create differing seniority
systems," as long as the rules established do not "depart fundamentally from
commonly accepted notions concerning the acceptable contours of a seniority
system." Id. at 608. See also Graham, Sentority Systems and Title VII - Reanalyszs and Redirection, 9 EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 81, 85-86 (1983).
Furthermore, section 703 (h) does not make a distinction between seniority
systems adopted before its effective date and those adopted after its effective
date. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 76, (1982). See also Graham, supra, at 83-84; Hernandez, supra note 95, at 355-57.
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these seniority rights are of a constitutional, statutory or contractual nature.
The Court in Wygant recognized that "the Constitution does
not require layoffs to be based on strict semority." 270 If an employee possessed a statutory right to be laid off only according to
strict seniority, neither the employer unilaterally, nor the employer
with consent from the union, could change the order to be followed
in case of layoffs. Section 703(h) of Title VII grants extensive protection to seniority systems without creating statutory seniority
rights for the employees covered by the Act. Unless the employee
laycan rely on a state law which mandates that seniority governs
2 71
offs, seniority rights remain solely contractual in nature.
Seniority rights certainly appear to be contractual rights. Unions tend to bargain for seniority rights and layoff provisions based
on semority 72 because these provisions substitute for the arbitrariness and subjectivity in the employer's decision making process and
provide a more objective rule, which relies primarily on the length
of the employee's service with the employer. 273 Because collective
bargaining agreements do not cover the whole sector of private employment, not all employees can rely on collectively bargained seniority rights. It is not uncommon, however, for a non-unionized
employer to institute some kind of seniority system in its company
274
as part of an effort to avoid unionization.
Employers may unilaterally adopt a personnel policy in an employee handbook that establishes a seniority system, including a
270. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 n.10 (1986) (emphasis added).
271. See Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 907 (1989). See
also Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority
Rights, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1534, 1541 (1962).
272. See Aaron, supra note 271, at 1534; Cerbone & Walsh, Management
Judgement v. Senwarity - Grstfor the ArbitrationMill, 14 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 429 (1988); Fallon & Weiler, supra note 263, at 55; Glendon & Lev, Changes
in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REv. 457,478 (1979); Gould, Employment Security, Sensority and
Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1, 1-3
(1967); Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and its
Implications, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1039 (1969); Graham, supra note 269, at 81; Hernandez, supra note 95, at 343; Stacy, supra note 231, at 489; Comment, Inevitable
Interplay, supra note 262, at 162.
273. See W GOULD, supra note 6, at 68; Aaron, supra note 271, at 1535; Edwards, supra note 5, at 770; Fallon & Weiler, supra note 263, at 56; Glendon &
Lev, supra note 272, at 478 n.103; Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and
Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1, 3
(1967); Levine, supra note 262, at 352; Comment, Inevitable Interplay, supra
note 262, at 162; Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,And The Incumbent
Negro, 80 HARv. L. REV.1260, 1263 (1967) [hereinafter Note, The Incumbent
Negro].
274. See Fallon & Weiler, supra note 258, at 55; Glendon & Lev, supra note
272, at 478; Hernandez, supra note 95, at 370.
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system of layoffs based on semority. Under certain circumstances,
state courts have considered employer personnel policies binding
upon the employer as an enforceable contractual obligation. 275 If
an employer lays off employees m a different order than the one
provided for in its employee handbook, the individual employee
276
may have a claim based on the employer's breach of contract.
When the employer voluntarily commits itself to two conflicting
contractual obligations - one towards its minority or female employees (preferential layoff provisions) 277 and one towards its white
male employees (layoffs based on seniority) - the employer should
bear the increased costs resulting from these conflicting contractual
obligations. The employer should honor both obligations. 278 Honoring both obligations, however, does not mean that the laid off
white male employee will get reinstated. A finding of an employer's breach of contract normally results in contract damages
279

only.

275. A landmark case in this area is Touissamt v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,

408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). Touwssatnt dealt with an employee hand-

book providing for discharge for cause only. The court held that such a provision can become part of the employee's contract "either by express agreement,
oral or written, or as the result of an employee's legitimate expectations based
on an employer's policy statements." Id. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885. See also
Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284,491 A.2d 1257 (1985); Coombe,
Employee Handbooks: Asset orLiability?,12 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 4 (1986); Hernandez, supra note 95, at 370; Johnston & Taylor, Employee Handbook- A Selective Survey of EmergingDevelopments, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 225 (1985); Witt
& Goldman, Avozding Lzability zn Employee Handbooks, 14 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 5 (1988).
276. See Hernandez, supra note 95, at 370.
277. When the employer's promises towards its minority or female employees are not part of a unilaterally declared personnel policy, or when the employer explicitly declined not to be bound by the policies declared, the
beneficiaries of the affirmative action effort will not be able to establish a
breach of contract by the employer. Moreover, because affirmative action is not
mandated by Title VII, the employer's violation of its own affirmative action
plan is not a Title VII violation.
278. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 767 (1983). See also
United States v. The City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1342 n.39 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Fifth Circuit declared:
It is possible that under some circumstances an employer who voluntarily
adopted an affirmative action plan which causes an employee to be deprived of such a vested right under his employment contract might contractually be liable to the employee in damages, although the plan is
perfectably acceptable under the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
Id.
279. If the employer's breach of contract is at the same time a Title VII violation, the equitable remedial powers of the court under Title VII would allow it
to order reinstatement. When the preferential layoff provisions, however, meet
the requirements for the statutory validity of affirmative action plans, no Title
VII violation will be established, and the laid off employee will be left with
contract damages only.
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When a nonumonized employer does not have any provisions
concerning layoffs based on seniority m its employee handbook, the
employer may exercise its managerial prerogatives to select the employees to lay off.280 If an employer has an affirmative action layoff
plan, and conducts a layoff pursuant to the plan, the employer will
not be liable for discrimination m violation of Title VII simply because the plan deals with layoffs. 281
In a unionized setting, the collective bargaining agreement will
most likely contain seniority-based layoff provisions. These provisions raise the question of whether an employer can unilaterally
change a collective bargaining agreement m order to enhance employment opportunities for women and minority workers. Some
lower courts consider the policies embraced m Title VII to be overriding and therefore hold that, to effectuate these policies, collective bargaining agreements must not be considered "sacrosanct and
can and should be modified and revised, even if done
'2 2
unilaterally."
However, the Supreme Court seems to have taken a different
Grace & Company v. Local Union 759. 2 83 There, the
stand m W.
employer entered into a conciliation agreement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission after a lengthy investigation indicated that there was reasonable cause to believe that the
employer violated Title VII by discrimmating against blacks and
women. 284 The conciliation agreement provided, among other
things, for preferential layoff provisions for women. These provisions contradicted the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union. The employer,
desiring to reduce its work force, faced a dilemma: "it could follow
the conciliation agreement... and risk liability under the collectivebargaining agreement, or it could follow the bargaining agreement
280. See Stacy, supra note 231, at 508. The employer's selection can not be
discriminatory on the basis of any of the impermissible criteria enumerated n
§ 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
281. The preferential layoff plan has to satisfy the requirements imposed
upon every affirmative action plan. Under these circumstances, however, it can
not be regarded as unsettling legitimate firmly rooted expectations because
there are no employee entitlements to being laid off according to seniority.
282. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F Supp. 1105, 1129 (E.D. Pa.
1973), aff'd, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Southbridge Plastics Div., W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers, 403 F Supp. 1183 (N.D. Miss. 1975), rev'd, 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir.
1978).
283. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983). See also Southbridge
Plastics Div., W.R. Grace Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978).
284. W.R Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 759.
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and risk both a contempt citation and Title VII liability." 2 5 The
Court considered the dilemma to be of the employer's own
2 86
makmng.
The Court stated that voluntary compliance with Title VII was
an important public policy, but it did not allow the employer to alter the collective bargaining agreement and escape its obligations
thereunder without the union's consent. "Permitting such a result
would undermine the federal labor policy that parties to a collective-bargaining agreement must have reasonable assurance that
their contract will be honored."28 7 When an employer voluntarily
takes up conflicting obligations, the combined enforcement of
which would not violate public policy, the employer should bear the
increased cost of complying with both. 28 8 The Court refused to allow the employer to transfer any part .of the burden. The supplementary incentive to comply with Title VII created by allowing the
employer to unilaterally change semority-based collective bargaining provisions and to adopt preferential layoff schemes for women
and minorities should not be paid for with the union's rights of
enforcement of the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement. 2s 9
Unilateral change of (semority-based) collective bargaining
provisions by establishing a preferential layoff scheme for women
or minorities is thus impermissible, even when it enhances compli285. Id. at 759.

286. Id. at 767.
287. Id. at 771. See also Hernandez, supra note 95, at 359 n.175.
288. Some commentators have advanced the argument that the employer
should carry the brunt of the cost accompanying the institution of affirmative
action plans and not the innocent white male employee. They adopt an "employer targeted approach," based on the assumption that the employer is the
wrongdoer who must bear the consequences of its own wrongful action. See,
e.g., Burke & Chase, supra note 158, at 81-116; Fallon & Weiler, supra note 263,
at 60-64. See also Spiegelman, supra note 188, at 416-19. In the context of voluntary affirmative action, these consideration are not very convincing. While it
may be justifiable to impose the costs solely on the employer when there is
evidence of its prior discrimination, the voluntary institution of affirmative action plans under Title VII does not require proof of prior employer discrmnation. The employer need not be a violator of Title VII to be permitted to engage
in affirmative action. A mere showing of a conspicuous or manifest unbalance
in the employer's work force is a sufficient justification. An employer may legitimately attempt to redress the effects of societal discrimination. White male
employees, as part of society, are as culpable as the employer with regard to
societal discrimination.
289. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 770 (1983). Most collective bargaining agreements provide for a compulsory arbitration procedure
and for specific remedies in case the agreement is violated. One of the possible
remedies often provided for in the collective bargaining agreement is reinstatement of the employees discharged or laid off in violation of the provisions of the
agreement. Arbitral awards, including those granting reinstatement are enforceable in court. See zd. at 763.
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ance with the ultimate goals of Title VII. Unless the employer is in
some way bound by the provisions instituting preferential layoffs,
minority or female interests are subordinated by seniority rights
provided for in collective bargaining agreements. It is important to
stress that an employer who violates the provisions of its own affirmative action plan does not necessarily violate the dictates of Title VII, because Title VII does not require the employer to institute
affirmative action plans in the first place.- When the employer's affirmative action plan is part of a consent decree, a violation of its
commands is open to judicial sanctions, including a citation for contempt of court. While it is not unlikely that courts will be sympathetic to employers that do not live up to the goals of an affirmative
action plan included in a consent decree when insufficient qualified
minority or female applicants are available, courts may not be willing to grant employers the same sympathy in this context. Courts
may consider forcing an employer to hire unqualified minority or
female applicants over qualified white male applicants more reprehensible than imposing upon the employer the increased cost of retaining a number of employees due to unexecuted layoffs. The
Supreme Court in W. Grace & Co. mentioned that obeying court
injunctions is often costly.2 9 ° The Court, however, did not exclude
the possibility that the district court might have granted the employer an exemption from the requirements of the conciliation
agreement. 29 ' If the courts are unwilling to grant the employer this
292
exemption, then the employer must bear the increased cost itself.
The Supreme Court in W.R. Grace & Co. suggested that the
employer might bargain with the union for a change in collective
bargaining agreement layoff provisions. 293 Seniority systems and
layoff provisions are proper subjects of collective bargaining; they
might even be considered mandatory subjects. 294 A collective bargaining agreement that establishes layoff provisions is binding on
the employer. Nothing, however, prevents the bargaining representative and the employer from changing provisions of a collective
290. Id. at 770.

291. Id. at 770 n.12.
292. Of course, the parties to the conflict can always settle their differences.
The fact that the Supreme Court is willing to hold the employer to the conflictmg obligations it voluntarily took up, increases the employees' and union's
chances to obtain an advantageous settlement.
293. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union ofthe United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 770 n.12 (1983).
294. Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act imposes a mutual obligation on the employer and the union as representative of the employees to
bargain collectively with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)). See also Rabm, FairRepresentation Constraintszn the Voluntary Elimination of Job Discmmznation, 5
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 337, 338-39 (1979-80); Stacy, supra note 231, at 518.
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bargaining agreement in a subsequent bargaining round.295 While a
collective bargaining agreement is in force, the employer is contractually bound to follow the procedures and rank order for conducting layoffs as they are provided for in the agreement. The right
to be laid off according to the principle "last in, first out" is not a
vested right in perpetuity. These rights do not vest absolutely; they
are subject to change by the parties to the collective bargaming
agreement. 295 Seniority rights do not guarantee a job2 9 7 and are not
vested in the way pension benefit rights are.2 9 8 "If the union determines, as a legislature might, that the interests of the bargaining
unit, considered as a whole, would be better served by a different
seniority arrangement, there is no impairment of obligations of any
2 99
contract and no 'vested rights' have been mfringed."
The Supreme Court in Wygant did not deny that strict seniority layoff schemes can be altered. The Court stressed, however,
that when a state actor inplements a layoff scheme based on race, it
295. Section 703(h) of Title VII grants extensive protection to seniority systems m force m a company, without, at the same time, converting the contractual rights into statutory rights. The extensive protection granted does not
preclude a change of the seniority systems. Civil Rights Act, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2. See United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1341 (5th Cir.
1980). In City of Miams, the Fifth Circuit stated:
To say that a seniority system is immunized from attack means that the
employer cannot be forced against its will to modify the system, not that
the employer cannot agree to change it.
.[M]ay an employer voluntarily
consent to changes in seniority provisions that do not abridge contractual,
statutory, or constitutional rights of its employees or their bargaining
agent. .?
Id. at 1341.
See also Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 658 F.2d 705, 706 n.1 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denzed, 456 U.S. 916 (1982); Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Civil Serv., 588 F Supp. 732, 734 (D.N.J. 1984), ffl'd, 770 F.2d 1077 (3d
Cir. 1985).
296. See Humprey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953); Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of FairRepresentation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 39, 47 (1961); Aaron, supra note 271, at 1533-34; Davidson, supra note 207, at 60; Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race:
The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1954, 13 How. L. REv. 1, 29 (1967);
Gould, supra note 14, at 655; Graham, supra note 269, at 82; Comment, Title VII
And Seniority, supra note 262, at 140; Comment, Inevitable Interplay, supra
note 262, at 164; Note, The Incumbent Negro, supra 273, at 1263, 1269. See also
Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 658 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1981) ("It is settled
that semority rights are not vested property rights and that these rules can be
altered to the detriment of any employees or group of employees by a good faith
agreement between the company and the union"), cert denied, 456 U.S. 916
(1982); Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 480 F Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979) ("Courts
have long recognized that seniority rights are not vested. They are subject to
alternation at the adoption of each collective bargaining agreement"), aff'd, 658
F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denzed, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
297. See Comment, Title VII And Senwrity, supranote 262, at 115 n.11.
298. See Aaron, supra note 271, at 1541.
299. Aaron, supra note 296, at 47 (quoting Baker, Employee Rights Under
Collectively BargainedGroup Plans 8 (unpublished paper)).
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must meet a heavy burden of justification.3 00 It should be noted
that preferential layoff schemes are not solely based on race or sex.
Race or sex is just one factor taken into account to determine which
employee the employer is going to lay off. In addition, the required
justification from a pmvate employer voluntarily instituting an affirmative action plan under Title VII is lower than the justification
under the equal protection clause. The employer does not infringe
upon any absolute employee entitlements when a union and an employer voluntarily change existing layoff provisions and adopt a
preferential layoff scheme for women and minorities. An affirmative action plan should be upheld, even if dealing with layoffs, when
the employer uses preferential treatment based on race or sex to
avoid losing the gains of an ongoing affirmative action effort aimed
at eliminating a manifest imbalance in the employer's work force,
when the employer considers more than race and sex in making the
employment decisions, and when the employer does not create an
absolute bar to the participation of the white males.
3)

Duty of Fair Representation

When an employer is willing to grant extended protection to
female and minority employees in case of layoffs, the consent of the
union is necessary to change the seniority provisions of an existing
collective bargaining agreement. Nothing guarantees, however,
that the union, as bargaining representative, shall be willing to cooperate. A flat refusal by the union to bargain over the proposed
preferential layoff provisions violates its duty to bargain in good
faith and thus constitutes an unfair labor practice.3 0 ' The National
Labor Relations Board acts to oversee and referee the process of
collective bargaining. It may require the parties to bargain on
mandatory subjects of collective bargamng.30 2 The Board's authority is, however, limited to supervision of the procedure only, without any official authority over the actual terms of the contract.
Therefore, the Board can not compel a party to accept the proposals
of the other bargaining party.3 03 If the bargaining process reaches
an impasse, the employer may, nevertheless, proceed with its plans
and implement the preferential layoff provisions. This will not be
considered a violation of the employer's duty to bargain in good
300. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 n.10 (1986).
301. See National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)). See also W GOULD, supra note 6, at
183.
302. For a discussion of bargaining in the context of the elimination of discrmimation, see W GOULD, supra note 6, at 183, 191-200.
303. See H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1970). See also NLRB v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952).

The John Marshall Law Remew

[V9ol. 24:731

faith. 304
A union's refusal to consider the introduction of preferential
layoff provisions which attempt to prevent the loss of the gains of
prior affirmative action might also violate the union's duty of fair
representation.3 0 5 Although the standards for finding a Violation of
the union's duty are fairly high, an absolute refusal even to consider
the introduction of preferential layoff provisions as proposed by the
employer should be considered a violation, because the union is required, "in collective bargaining and in the making of contracts.. .to
represent nonumon or minority union members.. .without hostile
discrimination, fairly, impartially and in good faith. 30° 6 Under
these circumstances the union's conduct should at least be considered arbitrary, 30 7 unless its refusal is based upon reasonable considerations such as the excessive cost affirmatave action might impose
on the bargaining unit as a whole.30 8 The fact that a majority of the
304. See Stacy, supra note 231, at 518. See also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736,
745 n.12 (1962).
305. The union's duty of fair representation is derived from its status as ex-

clusive representative for the employees of the bargaining unit:
The fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the organization
chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the majority as
well as the minority, and it is to act for all and not against those whom it
represents. It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a
granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward
them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf.
Steel v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
See also W. GOULD, supra note 6, at 166-77, 182-91; Aaron, supra note 296, at
39; Finkin, The Lzmits of Maority Rule in Collective Bargaining,64 MINN. L.
REV. 183, 193-94 (1980); Kopp, The Duty of FairRepresentationRemsited, 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 3, 4 (1979); Levine & Hollander, The Union's Duty of Fazr
Representation in Contract Administration,7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 193, 194-95
(1981); Sculnick, Westinghouse and East Dayton Tool The ContinuingEvolution of the Duty of FazrRepresentation,5 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 494, 497 (1979);
Comment, Inevitable Interplay, supra note 262, at 162, 170-71 (1974); Note,
UnionLiabilityforEmployer Discrimination,93 HARv. L. REv. 702,708 (1980).
306. Steel v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944). See also Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975)
('T ird, we have held, by the very nature of the exclusive bargaining representative's status as representative of all unit employees, Congress implicitly imposed upon it a duty fairly and in good faith to represent the interests of
minorities within the unit").
307. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) ("A breach of the statutory
duty of fair respresentation occurs only when a union's conduct towards a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith"). Vaca did not deal with the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements, but with the union's refusal to process grievances.
308. See Rabin, supra note 294, at 345-46; Note, Makzng Labor Unons Responsive to Working Women's Needs: Title VII and the Duty of FairRepresentation Compared, 2 HARv WOMEN'S L.J. 141, 161 (1979) [hereinafter Note,
Making Labor Unions Responsive]. See also Voltz & Breitenbeck, Comparable
Worth and the Unzon's Duty ofFairRepresentation,10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 30,
45-46 (1984) (courts should adopt a standard that would impose on unions an
"affirmative, positive obligation under the duty of fair representation and Title
VII to become advocates for the rights ofi their female members").
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union's members back the union m its refusal to consider the employer's proposition does not suffice as a justification for the position taken, because the union has a duty to represent all employees
in the unit, not only the majority.3 0 9
Questions concerning a possible violation of the duty of fair
representation also arise when the union actively engages in the negotiation of preferential layoff provisions detrimental to the interests of the majority of its members. Commentators argue that the
standards for establishing a violation of the union's duty of fair representation should be looser when the union is engaged in collective
bargaining than, for example, when dealing with the processing of
employee grievances.31 0

The Supreme Court, in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, dealt with
the grant of a seniority credit to employees who spent time in military service and allowed the bargaining representative a "wide
range of reasonableness in serving the unit it represents, subject
always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."3'1 The Court also recognized that the ultimate outcome of the bargaining process can hardly be expected to
completely satisfy all those represented by the umon.3 12 The Court
was not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining agent's
duty of fair representation merely because the agent took a good
faith position contrary to that of some individuals it represents, or
because it supported the position of one group of employees against
that of another.3 13 The cases the Supreme Court dealt with, however, did not involve changes to seniority schemes considering race
309. See Kopp, supra note 305, at 5. This is not to say that a majority vote
does not have any "probative" value m considering a possible violation of the
duty of good faith. However, the mere approval by a majority of union members of the trade union officials' decision not to even consider an employer's
proposed affirmative action plan m favor of the union's minority or female
members is meaningless when determining whether the union fairly repre-

sented all its members. See also Gould, Black Power sn the Unions: The Impact

Upon Collective BargazningRelationshzps, 79 YALE L.J. 46, 48 (1969) (emphasizing that the tension between majority and minority employees is especially
high where unions are defending semority systems "that harmed blacks in the
past and continue to do so"); Gould, Non-Governmental Remediesfor Employment Discrimination,20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 865, 877 (1969).
310. See Aaron, supra note 296, at 43; Finkm, supra note 305, at 197; Note,
The Incumbent Negro, supra note 273, at 1264; Note, Making Labor Unwns Responsive, supra note 308, at 161.
311. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). See also California
Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608 (1980) ("Significant freedom must be
afforded employers and unions to create differing seniority systems").
312. See Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. at 338 ("Inevitable differences arise in the
manner and degree to wich the terms of any negotiated agreement affect mdividual employees and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not makes them invalid"). See also Aaron, supra note 271, at 1552-53.
313. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); FordMotor Co., 345 U.S. at
349.
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314
or sex.
When a union and employer agree to establish an affirmative
action plan that satisfies the statutory requirements, a court should
not find a violation of the umon's duty of fair representation. An
affirmative action plan is valid under Title VII if the plan does not
unnecessarily trammel the rights of the white male majority, does
not create an absolute bar to the advancement of its non-beneficiaries, and does not base employment decisions solely on race or
sex. These requirements guarantee that the rights and interests of
the majority are considered and are not neglected in an arbitrary
manner.31 5 A valid affirmative action plan does not establish a
breach of Title VII and should not be considered discriminatory.316
By consenting to a valid affirmative action plan, the union does not
participate m discrimination. A valid affirmative action plan insures that the following competing interests are considered: the enhancement of equality of employment opportunities for women and
minority employees, on the one hand, and the absence of an excessive bar to the advancement and participation of the white male employees, on the other.
In addition, the system of collective bargaining and union representation, developed under the National Labor Relations Act, severely restrains the bargaining representative's practical abilities to
arbitrarily neglect the interests of the white male majority. A
union needs the support of a majority of the employees in the bargaming unit to keep its status as the exclusive bargaining representative. Fear of decertification 3 17 will severely limit a union's
willingness to "overemphasize" the interests of female and minority employees, representing only a minority of the union's membership and electorate.3 18 An arbitrary disregard of the interests of the
majority of employees is political suicide for the bargaining repre-

314. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 n.10 (1986).
315. See, e.g., Breshard v. Directors Guild, 34 BNA FEP Cas. 1045 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
Union efforts to promote lawful affirmative action on behalf of its women
and minorities does not violate its duty of fair representation.
Any actions by the DGA [union] to promote or even to agree to lawful affirmative
action for its racial minority or female members would not violate the
DGA's duty of fair representation to its white and male members.
Id. at 1050. It should be noted that the affirmative action plan at issue in Weber
was part of a collective bargaining agreement. The Court, however, did not address the issue of the union's duty of fair representation.
316. It should also be taken into account that in a reverse discrimination lawsuit, the employer may rebut the inference of discrimination resulting from a
plaintiff's prima facze case by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. A valid affirmative action plan is considered to be such a reason.
317. See National Labor Relations Act, § 9(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 151-69
(1982).
318. A valid affirmative action plan is intended to remedy a manifest umbalance in the employer's work force. Under these circumstances, minority and
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sentative. 319 Most commonly, trade union officials will not sign a
collective bargaining agreement, and certainly not one dealing with
preferential layoff provisions that might work to the detrnment of
the majority of their members, without asking for approval or ratification by the membership.
It is unlikely that trade union officials will agree with the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement that fails to carry the
3 20
support of at least a majority of the trade union members.
Therefore, the membership remains indirectly involved in the bargaining process. A majority vote decides the acceptance or rejection
of the proposal modifying contractual semority rights. 321 Not all of
the membership will be pleased with the ultimate result, but this is
inherent in a democratic system of "government."
The fact that a majority of trade union members voted upon
and approved a proposed agreement should be considered a suffi3 22
cient safeguard for the interest of the white male majority.
Without the consent of the "majority of the majority" it is unlikely
that a proposed agreement will ever be ratified. The above argument, that a majority vote for the rejection of any favorable action
towards minority or female employees is not sufficient to establish
the absence of a violation of the union's duty of fair representation,
fails to have the same strength in this setting. When a majority of
the white males approves the preferential treatment of the minority to their own detriment as a group, a strong argument exists that
the interests of the majority were not disregarded in an arbitrary or
discrimnatory fashion. The bargaining representative's good faith
should be presumed.
female employees are likely to only constitute a minority of the employees in
the bargaining unit.
319. See Stacy, supra note 231, at 517.
320. A trade umon's constitutions and by-laws will normally describe the
procedure to be followed for approval of a proposed collective bargaining
agreement.
...
321. When the union agrees to institute preferential layoff provisions, it does
not - and can not - bargain away a Title VII right. The bargain only involves
a contractual semority right. See Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 658 F.2d 705
(9th Cir. 1981), cert denzed, 456 U.S. 916 (1982). In Tangren, the Ninth Circuit
stated:
Plainly, rights established under Title VII are not rights which can be bargained away, either by a union, by an employer or by both in concert.
In
this instance, however, no Title VII rights have been violated. Semority is
merely an economic right which the unions may elect to bargain away.
Id. at 707. But see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281 n.8 (1986).
322. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 317-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also zd. at
309-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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C. Remedial Nature Prong
The requirement that a valid affirmative action plan should be
a remedial measure relates to the first prong of the Court's analysis
and is part of the Court's (present) second prong. The manifest imbalance prong, itself, remains an expression of the requirement that
the plan be remedial. To avoid liability for discrimination towards
white male employees, the employer may only institute an affirmative action plan that responds to a manifest imbalance in the composition of its work force. In the absence of a manifest imbalance,
courts strike down the affirmative action plan as a conflict with the
dictates of Title VII, as explained in Weber and Johnson.
The Supreme Court mentioned in both Weber and Johnson,
while dealing with the analysis of the burden prong, that the affirmative action plan at issue was intended to attain, not to maintam, a balanced work force. The Court futher mentioned that the
plan was not intended to be permanent;the plan would end as soon
as its purpose of proportional representation was reached. 32s Because these conditions are more directly related to the nature of the
plan itself than to whether the rights of the white male majority
were unnecessarily intruded upon, this part of the inquiry is more
accurately considered a separate, and third, prong.
1.

Attainment of a Balanced Work Force3 24

According to the first prong of the statutory analysis, the institution of an affirmative action plan is not justified if the employer
can not show a manifest imbalance in its work force. Under these
circumstances, the purpose of the plan can not be to attain a balanced work force. Absent a manifest imbalance, the composition of
the work force of the employer must be considered already "sufficiently balanced." The preferential treatment of -minority and/or
female applicants or employees under such conditions constitutes a
323. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 639-40 (1987); United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 208-09 (1979).
324. Arguments have been advanced to allow employers to institute nonremedial affirmative action to mainmtam a balanced work force and the benefits
that come along with having an integrated work force. See Note, Rethznking
Weber, supra note 60, 658-71. See also Sullivan, Sins of Discnmznation: Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78-98 (1986). Sullivan
argues for a forward looking rationale, as opposed to looking at the past sins of
discrimnation, as a justification for instituting valid affirmative action plans.
The rationale seems now to be at least partly adopted by the Supreme Court. In
Johnson the Supreme Court did not look backwards to find pror and
individualized discrimination as the necessary justification of an affirmative
action plan. See Johnson,480 U.S. at 631-37.
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Title VII violation 25 A plan that attempts to freeze proportional
representation in "perpetuity" does not remedy the effects of past
exclusionary practices and societal discrimination; instead, it institutionalizes the consideration of race and sex.326 The purpose of
Title VII is to eliminate the last vestiges of employment discrimination, and to establish a race- and sex-neutral employment decision
making process upon reaching this goal. Permanent consideration
of race and sex runs counter to these goals.
This does not mean, however, that an affirmative action plan is
immediately invalid merely because its duration extends for a reasonable period beyond attaining a numerical balance in the em325. The action undertaken in an affirmative action plan can be such that it
does not infringe on white male rights and interests, even if the plan is maintamed for a long period of time. For instance, an increased recruitment effort
directed toward minority ghettos when minority applicants, for whatever reason, previously fell outside the employer's application pool, would not infringe
on white male rights. When the affirmative recruitment effort succeeds and
reaches its goal of increased minority application, white males will confront increased competition for the positions available with the employer. This increased competition can hardly be regarded as a "trammeling" of the white
male majority's rights. For an example of an affirmative action effort of this
kind, see Schenkel-Savit & Seltzer, Recruitment as a Successful Means ofAffirmative Action, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 465, 472-79 (1987-88).
The institution of plans of such a nature will hardly cause any problems for
the employer to overcome, as far as the second prong of the analysis of the
statutory validity of the affirmative action plan is concerned. Even maintaimng
a plan of this kind can not really be seen as a trammeling of the majority's
rights. However, problems might arise for the justification prong of the analysis. The justification prong of the analysis requires the plan to be a reaction to a
manifest imbalance in the employer's work force. When a plan reaches its purpose and is maintained over a reasonable period of time to ensure that the desired effect of increased minority application will continue, the plan will have
no remedial justification any more.
Blumrosen argues that, after a certain period of time, preferential treatment should cease. "There is evidence that when sufficient numbers of minorties and women are employed in a given establishment, the informal process of
economic life - for example, the tendency to refer friends and relatives for
employment - will help to produce a significant applicant flow for both minorities and women." Blumrosen, supra note 230, at 685-86. Blumrosen further
suggests that at a certain moment, a" 'take-off point' will be reached where the
ordinary process of life will assure fair employment. Id. at 686.
The hope is that once minorities and women are fully integrated into the
labor force, the normal operation of the economic system will perpetuate
their inclusion, just as historically it perpetuated their exclusion. At that
point the law should confine itself to the more modest but very important
task of adjudication of specific instances of alleged discrimination.
Id. at 694-95. See also Blumrosen, supra note 14, at 22-23. Of course, there is no
absolute guarantee that fair employment practices will maintain the proportionality reached in the employer's work force. See Note, Rethmnking Weber,
supra note 60, at 667. The presumption, however, should be that it will maintam the proportionality of the work force. Absent special circumstances, an
affirmative action plan should not be maintained after it reached its purpose.
326. See Ledoux v. Dist. of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See also Boyd, supra note 14, at 23;
Buchanan, supra note 30, at 237.
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ployer's work force. The effects of societal pressures and
discrimination exist beyond the moment the employer reaches statistical parity in its work force. The employer should have a reasonable period of tune after reaching proportional representation in its
work force to determine if the measures adopted really had the intended effect. 32 Reaching a momentary balance is not the ultimate
goal of any affirmative action plan. The Supreme Court, in Johnson, accepted the affirmative action plan because the plan's purpose
mirrored the purpose of Title VII. The purpose of the plan was to
eliminate the last vestiges of discrimination in the work place. 328
Insuring that the plan reached its goal is part of the process of eliminating employment discnmination.3 -9
Affirmative action plans aimed at maintaining the gains of
prior affirmative action efforts are not necessarily to be equated
with plans aimed at maintaining a balanced work force. This is especially true for a plan attempting to preserve the success already
achieved towards the ultimate goal of a proportional work force
when economic circumstances force the employer to reduce its
work force. Frequently those last hired are the first ones fired. An
employer's effort to preserve difficult affirmative action gains
should not be invalidated merely because it does not bring the employer any closer to its ultimate goal. Not sliding back on the steep
and difficult path leading to equality of employment opportunities
for all is as valuable as taking the next step forward.
The Supreme Court's requirement that an affirmative action
plan should be remedial, ained at attaining a balanced work force,
and not aimed at maintaining proportional representation, is further exemplified by the Supreme Court's requirement that a valid
affirmative action plan be temporary. An affirmative actaon plan
must be a temporary measure intended to attain a racial and/or sexual balance and not a permanent numerical balancing device.
327. See Note, Rethznkzng Weber, supra note 60, at 671. This author argues
that employers should be allowed to "maintain" affirmative action efforts in
order "to rationalize human resource management systems, encourage diversity
and individual expression." Id. The emphasis of a test designed to analyze the
statutory validity of an affirmative action plan, it is argued, should be placed on
the "unnecessarily trammeling" of the rights of the white male majority.
328. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 642 (1987).
329. See, e.g., United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir.
1980). The Fifth Circuit rightfully approved an affirmative action plan contamed m a consent decree. One of the provisions of the plan reads as follows:
"The interim goal for blacks and women set forth m paragraph 2 shall continue
in effect for each department or district until the long term goals for that department or district have been achieved and maintained for a period of a year."
Id. at 1369.
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2. Liberal Construction of the TemporarnessRequirement
The requirement that a valid affirmative action plan be a temporary measure should be construed liberally. "Temporary" should
be understood to mean not perpetual, endless or everlasting. 330 An
affirmative action plan in force for a very long period of time is
temporary as long as the manifest imbalance it is aimed at eliminat33
ing persists. '
The Supreme Court, in Weber, mentioned the temporary character of the plan at issue in relation to.the fact that the plan was not
aimed at maintaining a racial balance.33 2 In Johnson, the Supreme
Court upheld an affirmative action plan, in the absence of an explicit end date:
It is thus unsurprising that the Plan contains no explicit end date, for
the Agency's flexible, case-by-case approach was not expected to yzeld
success in a briefperod of time. Express assurance that a program is
program actually sets aside poonly temporary may be necessary if the
3 33
sitions according to specific numbers.
An affirmative action plan that does not unnecessarily trammel
the rights of the white male majority should not be invalidated
merely because it does not provide an explicit end date.3 m All affirmative action plans with an ultimate goal of attaining a balanced
composition in the work force are "temporary. '"ss 5 All these plans
330. See Kreiling & Mercurio, supra note 14, at 65.
331. The acceptable duration of an affirmative action plan includes the reasonable period of time between the moment a statistical balance is reached and
the moment there is reasonable certainty that the plan reached its purpose.
See,' e.g., Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys., 651 F.2d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 1981). See
Boyd, supra note 14, at 23; Vaughn, supra note 3, at 562.
332. See United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979).
333. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 639-40 (1987) (emphasis added).
334. See, e.g., Lilly v. City of Beckley, W Va., 797 F.2d 191,195 (4th Cir. 1986).
335. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 770 F
2d 752 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). The Ninth Circuit Court statedUndoubtedly, a plan must end when its remedial function has served. The
fact that the plan must end, however, does not necessitate the inclusion of
an explicit ending provision. We read Weber to require that a plan be temporary m the sense that it must end when its goals of parity are met.
Id. at 757. See also Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1534 (11th Cir. 1985),
aff'd sub. nom, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1134 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 485 U.S. 1005
(1984); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 892 (6th Cir. 1983), cert dented,
464 U.S. 1040 (1984); La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1982);
Sester v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 969 (8th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Harvey, 648
F Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 625 F Supp. 30,
34 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 804 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 935
1983), qffl'd, 757
(1987); Ende v. Board of Regents, 565 F Supp. 501, 511 (N.D. Ill.
F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985); Van Aken v. Young, 541 F Supp. 448, 458 (E.D. Mich.
1982), aff'd, 750 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1984); Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F
Supp. 144, 149 (C.D. Ill. 1981), revd, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982); Tangren v.
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Therefore, the requirement that an

affirmative action plan be temporary is not an independent requirement for the statutory validity of the plan. 337
At the moment the affirmative action plan remedies the mainfest unbalance that justified the initial institution of the affirmative
action plan, the plan automatically ends, unless specifically provided otherwise. As argued above, an employer should be allowed
to use the preferential treatment provisions of its plan for a reasonable period after reaching the goal of proportional representation.
The end date of the plan is the date of reaching statistical parity in
the composition of the work force, with an extension for a reasonable period beyond this date as established by the employer in its
plan.

338

The Supreme Court, in Johnson, indicated that an explicit end
date is not required in an affirmative action plan that considers race
or sex as only one factor in the decision making process.3 3 9 The
Court mentioned, however, that an express end date may be necessary when the affirmative action plan sets aside a specific number
ofpositions for female or minority job applicants.- 40 There is, however, no need for a specific end date when the plan satisfies the
other requirements of the inquiry into its statutory validity, even
when it uses set asides.3 1 The specific number of positions set aside
Wackenhut Servs., 480 F Supp. 539, 549 (D. Nev. 1979), qff'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. dened, 456 U.S. 916 (1982). See also Ende v. Board of Regents,
565 F Supp. 501, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1983), where the court considers the permanence
argument illusory: "Few organizational plans are truly permanent; realistically
they are subject to constant change." All affirmative action plans that establish
an end goal should thus be presumed to be temporary, since an end date is implied. "The mere speculation that an affirmative action plan would be maintamed" is not a sufficient ground for invalidating it. See Smith v. Harvey, 648 F
Supp. 1103, 1114-15 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
336. See, e.g., Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 480 F Supp. 539, 549 (D. Nev.
1979) ("We must assume that WSI [Wackenhut Services, Inc.] and IGAN [Independent Guard Association of Nevada] will eliminate the preference in favor
of minorities when it no longer becomes necessary to artificially insure that
minorities are adequately represented in WSI's work force"), aff'd, 658 F.2d 705
(9th Cir. 1981), cert denzed, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
337. See Note, Rethinking Weber, supra note 60, at 666.
338. See, e.g., United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1366, 1369
(5th Cir. 1980).
339. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 639-40 (1987).
340. Id.
341. The Supreme Court explained why an explicit end date may be necessary when an affirmative action plan sets aside a specific number of positions
for minorities and/or female applicants. "This is necessary both to minimize the
effect of the program on other employees, and to ensure that the plan's goals 'are
balance, but rather as a
not being used simply to achieve and maintain
benchmark against which' the employer may measure its progress in eliminating the underrepresentation of minorities and women." Id. at 640 (emphasis added). When a plan satisfies both the requirements mentioned by the Supreme
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probably guarantees that the ultimate goal of a balanced work force
will be reached in a reasonably short period. Fear that the plan
may be in force for an extended period of time should thus be less
than in the case-by-case method used in Johnson.342 The requirement that a valid affirmative action plan be temporary is not an
43
additional hurdle for the approval of a plan using set asides.3
A court should not invalidate an affirmative action plan that
uses quotas or percentages as its method of reaching a balanced
work force because of the absence of a specific end date. 44 Concerning the temporariness requirement, these plans can be divided
into three groups: the percentages used in the'plan can be equal to
the ultimate goal (balanced work force), the percentages used can
be lower than the ultimate goal, or the percentages can be higher
than this goal. All of these plans contain an implicit end date: the
date of reaching a balanced work force. When the plan includes
accelerated interim goals, the plan achieves the desired balance in a
shorter period of time. Lower interim goals are less intrusive, but
are less likely to have success in a short period of time. Once the
plan reaches the goal, all plans automatically dissolve.3 5
The fact that a collective bargaining agreement, that is open to
renegotiation after its date of expiration includes an affirmative action plan does not mean that the plan must be characterized as an
"ongoing balancmg-maintenance-measure." 346 When the plan sets
Court - minimizing the effect on non-beneficiares and attaining a balanced
work force as ultimate purpose of the plan,- the provision of an explicit end
date will thus become superfluous.
342. The Supreme Court, in Johnson, even mentioned the fact that the
Agency's plan might not result in a substantial improvement of female representation in a short period of time, but that only a gradual increase was to be
expected. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640.
343. In considering the over-all reasonableness of a plan using set asides, one
factor to take into account is the amount of time the employer estimates to be
necessary to reach the set goal. This is, however, only one of,the several factors
that needs to be taken into account.
344. But see Johnson v. Transportation Agency Santa Clara County, Cal., 770
F 2d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1984) ("the requirement that a fixed percentage of openings be filled by minorities necessitated a reasonably explicit deadline"), affl'd,
480 U.S. 616 (1987); Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1302 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) ("Johnson makes clear, however, that the plan itself need not identify
an explicit termination point, unless, as was the case m Weber, it sets aside
positions according to specific numbers"), vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (1988); Baker v.
City of Detroit, 483 F Supp. 930, 1003 (E.D Mich. 1979) ("some form of terminating period needs to be placed on the affirmative action plan - either a date
or a point at which the Department reaches a certain racial balance"), aff'd,
Bratton v. Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert dented,464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
345. See United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1366 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1340 (5th Cir. 1980).
346. See, e.g., Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 775 F.2d 794,
806 (7th Cir. 1985), cert dented, 484 U.S. 925 (1987). See also United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The plan at issue in Weber
was part of a collective bargaining agreemeht.
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a balanced work force as its ultimate goal, it implicitly adopts an
end date: the date at which the balance will be reached. Furthermore, the plan only lasts the duration of the collective bargaining
agreement. 34 7 There is no indication, and certainly no proof, that
the employer and the (exclusive) bargaining agent will again reach
an agreement on the re-institution of the plan. The manifest imbalance in the employer's work force will probably be reflected in the
composition of the umon that is acting as bargaining representative.
Common sense indicates that the white male majority in the bargaining unit is more likely to disapprove than to approve an affirmative action plan that works to the benefit of minorities and women,
and thus to their own detriment.
If any of the different methods used in affirmative action plans
can be questioned under the independent "temporariness requirement," it is the flexible plan that would be questioned, because this
is the type of plan that most likely will not be successful in the
short range and will need to exist over a longer period of time. Yet,
the Supreme Court explicitly accepted that the absence of an explicit end date is not an obstacle for upholding this kind of plan.
Plans that use set asides or percentage goals remain likely to succeed in a shorter period of time and should thus easily satisfy the
temporariness requirement. Considering the temporariness requirement as a completely independent requirement leads to an internal contradiction in the analysis of the statutory validity of
affirmative action plans. The plans that are likely to be in force
over an extended or prolonged period of time are considered less
intrusive on the rights of the white male majority. The most burdensome plans probably reap success in a more limited time span.
The potential conflict between the requirement that an affirmative
action plan not greatly intrude upon the rights of the non-beneficiaries of the plan, on the one hand, and the requirement that a
plan be temporary, on the other, should be resolved in favor of the
former.
347. See Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 480 F Supp. 539, 549 (D. Nev. 1979)
(fact that collective bargaining agreement is subject of renegotiation every
three years as expression of temporary character of plan), aff'd, 658 F.2d 705
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 456 U.S. 916 (1982). See also Breshard v. Directors

Guild, 34 BNA FEP Cas. 1045,1047-48 (C.D. Cal. 1984). ContraMarsh v. Board
of Educ., 581 F Supp. 614, 626 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir.
1985). In a similar way, the notice provisions for termination that are often part
of a consent decree containing an affirmative action plan can be regarded as a
supplementary expression of the affirmative action plan's temporary naturesupplemental to the implicit end date of reaching the goal of the affirmative
action plan. See, e.g., United States v. State of New Jersey, 614 F Supp. 387, 395
(D.C.N.J. 1985). The extension of the duration of a consent decree does not
change the nature of the affirmative action plan contained in it, from temporary
to permanent. See Bridgeport Firebird Soc'y v. City of Bridgeport, 686 F Supp.
53, 60 (D. Conn. 1988). The extension of the duration of a consent decree can be
compared to the renegotiation of a collective bargaining agreement.
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An affirmative action plan should be a temporary measure, indeed. But temporary means nothing more than not permanent.
Temporary means attaining a balanced work force and not merely
maintaining an already established balance for eternity.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's inquiry into the statutory validity of affirmative action plans under Title VII can appropriately be described as a three stage analysis, colored by an unwarranted fear
that preferential treatment might be granted to unqualified minority or female applicants.
The main hurdle for an employer willing to engage in affirmative action is the requirement that the plan can not create an absolute bar to the participation of the white males. The different
methods employers use, such as quotas or percentage goals, set
asides, or the use of race and sex as a factor, do not justify any difference in the legal treatment of the plan. In practice, these methods appear to function in a highly comparable way. Stressing the
voluntary nature of the effort by the private employer and taking
into account that profit maximizing intentions are their driving
force, one should realize that the methods mentioned here do not
place undue pressure on employers to engage in any kind of preferential treatment towards unqualified applicants or employees.
Hard and fast rules are inappropriate for determining whether an
absolute bar has been created to the participation of white males.
Full consideration should be given to the particular circumstances
that triggered the institution of the affirmative action effort and to
the context in which it operates.
Courts addressing reverse discrimination lawsuits challenging
the validity of affirmative action plans should engage in a double,
highly fact-specific inquiry, separate from the (three part) inquiry
the Supreme Court actually applies now. The first question courts
should ask is whether the employer's work force was manifestly
nmbalanced as compared to the composition of the general area labor market. If so, courts should then determine whether sufficient
room is left for the advancement and participation of the non-beneficiaries of the plan. Based on the analytical framework the
Supreme Court adopted for reverse discrimination lawsuits, the employer's reasonably proffered justification for its action and the extent to which its action lasts should enjoy a defacto presumption of
validity. Unless the white male challenger of the plan convinces
the court of the plan's invalidity under Title VII, the employer's
voluntarily effort to engage in an attempt to eradicate the last vestiges of discrimination in the work place should not be invalidated.

